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HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY
FROM THE LIBRARY OF
NORWOOD PENROSE HALLOWELL
CLASS OF 1861
■r
37th Congress, ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. ( Rrp. Com. 3d Session. j \
REPORT
THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE
CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
IN THREE PARTS.
WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1863.
US^'^.SJ
HARVARD COLLEGE L19RARY
FRO:i TfJE ir^-vf OF
NORWOOD FC!. "I !!.uio'*:ell
SEPTEiViDER 28, 1934
In the Senate of the United States, March 2, 1863.
Resolved, by the Senate of the United Statet, (the House of Representatives concurring,) That in order to enable the* " Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War " to complete their investigations of certain important matters now before them, and which they have not been able to complete, by reason of inability to obtain important witnesses, be authorised' to continue their sessions for thirty days after the close of the present Congress, and to place their testimony and reports in the hands of the Secretary of the Senate.
Resolved, further, That the Secretary of the Senate is hereby directed to cause to be printed, of the reports and accompanying testimony of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 5,000 copies for the use of the Senate, and 10,000 copies for the use of the House of Representatives.
Attest: J. W. FORNEY, Secretary.
In the House of Representatives, March 2, 1863. Resolved, That the House concur in the foregoing resolutions of the Senate to continue the sessions of the "Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War" for thirty days, and to direct the Secretary of the Senate to cause the printing of the reports, &c., with the fol- lowing amendment : insert at the end the words : "of the present Congress."
Attest : EM. ETHERIDGE, Clerk.
In the Senate of the United States, March 2, 1863. Retolved, That the Senate concur in the foregoing amendment of tfce House of Represen- tatives to said resolution.
Attest: « J. W. FORNEY, Secretary.
April 6, 1863. Mr. Wade, from the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, in accordance with the preceding resolution, placed in the hands of the Secretary of the Senate the follow- ing report in three parts.
Part 1.— ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Part 2.— BULL RUN— BALL'S BLUFF.
Part 3.— WESTERN DEPARTMENT, OR MISSOURI— MISCELLANEOUS
<J-
REPORT
OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
PART II.— BULL RUN— BALL'S BLUFF.
BU1,L RUN.
The joint committee on the conduct of the war submit the following report, with accompanying testimony, in relation to the battle of Bull Run, in July, 1861 :
So long a time has elapsed, and so many important events have occurred in the progress of the war, since the campaign which ended with the battle of Bull Run, in July, 1861, that your committee do not deem it necessary to go very much into detail in their report. The testimony they submit herewith is very voluminous, and fully covers all the points of interest connected with that cam- paign. They therefore submit a brief report, confining their attention princi- pally to the causes which led to the defeat of our army in that battle.
That which now appears to have been the great error of that campaign was the failure to occupy Centreville and Manassas at the time Alexandria was oc- cupied, in May. The position at Manassas controlled the railroad communica- tion in all that section ef country. The forces which were opposed to us at the battle of Bull Run were mostly collected and brought to Manassas during the months of June and July. The three months' men could have made the place easily defensible against any force the enemy could have brought against it ; and it is not at all probable that the rebel forces would have advancea beyond the line of the Rappahannock had Manassas been occupied by our troops.
The next cause of disaster was the delay in proceeding against the enemy until the time of the three months' men was so nearly expired. In that respect the movement was made too late rather than too soon, and the enemy were al- lowed time to collect their forces at Manassas and to strengthen the position by defensive works. The reason why the movement was so long delayed is shown, to some extent, by the testimony, to which your committee would direct the attention of those who desire to examine that point.
And when the movement was finally determined upon, much was needed to "render the troops efficient. There had bee,n but little time devoted to disciplin- ing the troops and instructing them, even as regiments ; hardly any instruction had been given them in reference to brigade movements, and none at all as divisions. When General McDowell reviewed eight regiments together1 — the only^instance previous to the battle, so for as the evidence shows, that even that number of troops were manoeuvred in one body — he was charged with desiring to make a show.
General McDowell was instructed, verbally, by General Scott, to prepare and submit a plan of operations against the enemy at Manassas. This plan was considered • in cabinet meeting, and agreed to ; and the 9th of July was fixed upon by General Scott as the day when the army should move.
The plan of General McDowell was to move out in the direction of Oentre- vflle, and endeavor to turn the enemy's right with a portion of his force, and
4 > CONDUCT OP THE WAR.
, destroy his communication by railroad with Richmond. He asked that a certain number of troops be given him to operate against the force which it was esti- mated that Beauregard had under his command. He was assured that the enemy below should be kept occupied by General Butler, who was in command at Fortress Monroe; and that the enemy under Johnston, in the Winchester val- ley, should be held there by General Patterson. Some days before the battle, upon expressing some fears in regard to the force under Johnston being de- tained by Patterson, he was assured by General Scott that "if Johnston joined •Beauregard, he should have Patterson on his heels."
The movement did not commence until the 16th of July, a week later than the time first decided upon. The transportation was deficient, and General McDowell had to depend upon others to see that supplies were forwarded to him in time. The march was slow, one reason being that, since the affair at Vienna, near Alexandria, and at Big Bethel, near Fortress Monroe, a fear of "masked batteries" caused hesitation in regard to advancing upon points con- cerning which there was a want of information. There was some delay, on the march, in consequence of the want of complete discipline among some of the troops. They were not sufficiently under control of officers to be prevented from leaving the ranks and straggling.
The affair at Blackburn's Ford, on Thursday, the 18th, being more extensive than General McDowell had ordered, drew the attention of the enemy to that point ; and, in consequence of the preparations they made there to meet any at- tempt of General McDowell to turn their position in that direction, it became necessary to adopt another line of operations. General McDowell determined to make the attempt to turn their right, and steps were taken to secure the necessary information. It was not until Saturday that the information which General McDowell desired was obtained.
He then issued orders for the troops to move the next morning, the 21st, some at two o'clock and some at half-past two. The division of General Tyler was in the advance, and was ordered to proceed directly out to Stone Bridge, and take up position there. General Hunter's and General Heintzelman's divisions were to follow, and when they reached a road leading to the right, about a mile in advance of General Tyler's camp, they were to turn off and proceed in the direction of Sudley's Church, and endeavor to turn the enemy's left. The movement to the right was intended to be made under cover of General Tyler's force at Stone Bridge. .
But there was much delay in the movements of the troops that morning. Tyler's division did not pass the point, where Hunter's and Heintzelman's divi- sions were to turn off, until after the time designated. Some of the troops were delayed for three hours, affording time to the enemy to discover the movement and make preparations to meet it.
Notwithstanding these disadvantages, our forces were successful during the fore part of the day, although Beauregard had been re-enforced by some of John- ston's forces from Winchester. Our troops were very much fatigued. The day- was exceedingly warm ; the roads were dusty ; and they had been some hours longer on the march than had been anticipated. In the afternoon additional re- enforcements arrived from Johnston's army, and suddenly attacked our right and threw it into disorder.
About the same time two of our batteries (Ricketts's and Griffin's) were captured by the enemy, .and our entire force began to fall back in great con- fusion. In regard to the capture of the batteries, it appears by the testimony that they were ordered to take an advanced and exposed position, and were not sufficiently supported. Not long after they were placed in position, a rebel regiment appeared in their immediate vicinity. Captain Griffin states that he took them to be rebels from the first, and directed one of his lieutenants to open upon them with canister. But Major Barry, chief of artillery, coming up jus
CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 5
at the time, told him that they were some of our own troops coming to the sup- port of the batteries, and directed him not to fire upon them. The battery was accordingly turned in another direction, and, almost immediately after, this regi- ment of the enemy opened fire upon it, disabling the horses, and killing and wounding most of the men at the guns. That completed the discomfiture of our troops, and the day which had opened upon our success, closed upon a defeated and retreating army.
A division, under Colonel Miles, had been stationed at Centreville, partly for the purpose of a reserve, and partly to guard against any flank attack. The enemy did attempt a movement upon our left, but were promptly met. andi checked by our forces there.
The principal cause of the defeat on that day was the failure of General Patterson to hold the forces of Johnston in the valley of the Shenandoah. He had a force of about 23,000 men ; while the force of the enemy opposed to him, according to the best evidence your committee could obtain, did not exceed from 12,000 to 15,000 men. General Patterson testifies that he was satisfied that Johnston had from 35,000 to 40,000 men, and over 60 guns. He also states that a large number of his troops were anxious to return home ; that their time had about expired, and he could not persuade them to remain. There is con- siderable testimony to show that the troops became dissatisfied, and refused to remain, only when they learned that their movement from Bunker Hill on the 17 th of July was a retreat, and not an advance upon the enemy ; that while they supposed they were being led to the attack, little, if any, complaint was made, and they were in excellent spirits.
In reference to the orders given to General Patterson, and the object to be accomplished by his operations, there seems to be no question. That object was to prevent Johnston from joining Beauregard before General McDowell could have an opportunity to attack the forces under the latter. The character of the orders is indicated by the following telegram of the 13th of July (Satur- day) from General Scott to General Patterson :
",I telegraphed you yesterday, if not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of Winchester. But if he retreats in force towards Manassas, and it be hazardous to follow him, then consider the route via Keyes's Ferry, Leesburg, &c."
General Scott had, the day before, conveyed to General Patterson the inti- mation that General McDowell would commence hiB movement on the 16th or July, and on the 15th General Patterson advanced from Martinsburg to Bunke- Hill, remaining there the 16th.
On the 17th General Scott telegraphs to General Patterson :
" I have nothing official from you since Sunday, but am glad to learn through Philadelphia papers that you have advanced. Do not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in front, whilst he re-enforces the Junction with his main body. McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fair- fax Court-House. The Junction will probably be carried to-morrow."
There is no evidence at what time that despatch was received. But it could not have been received before the movement from Bunker Hill to Charlestown was made by General Patterson, for that movement commenced very early in the morning of the 17th, the date of the despatch.
On the 18th General Scott telegraphs :
" I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy. If not, that you had felt him strongly, or at least had occupied him by threats and demonstra- tions. You* have been at least his equal, and, I suppose, superior in number. Has he not stolen a march, and sent re-enforcemehts towards Manassas Junc- tion ? A week is enough to win a victory."
6 CONDUCT OF THE WAB.
To this General Patterson replies on the same day :
"The enemy has stolen* no march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and, by threats and reconnoissances in force, caused him to be re- enrorced."
General Patterson testifies as follows :
" Question. During all this time you knew that General Scott expected of you that you should either engage and beat Johnston, or detain him in the val- ley of Winchester; or, in the event that he should come down by a route where you could not follow him, that you should follow him via Keyes's Ferry and Leesburg ?
"Answer. Yes, sir.
" Question. And yet, when you were at Oharlestown, you found yourself not in a condition to do either. Now, my question is : Why did you not communi- cate that fact to General Scott ?
" Answer. There was no occasion for it, in my judgment. He knew my con- dition, and to have added to the information he already had would have been a waste of time and paper. I had informed him of my condition, and it was his business to order me what to do. I had asked him : ' Shall I attack ? ' It was not my business to say anything beyond that."
When asked if the telegram of the 18th, from General Scott, did not show that he still deemed it was of the first importance that he (Patterson) should detain Johnston there, General Patterson replies :
" I looked upon that telegraph, and so did every gentleman upon my staff, as nothing more nor less than an exhibition of bad temper."
General Patterson also testifies :
4" Question. You say you could have attacked on the 18th if ordered to do so. You knew the necessity of detaining Johnston, and you must have inferred- from the telegraph of General Scott that he expected or required o£ you that you should do something in that direction. Why did you not do all that you could to detain him without an order 1
" Answer. Because I could not go up there without fighting, as I could not fall back again. I had no reason to believe that that telegram was not written in the morning in reply to mine of that morning, [1.30 a. m., asking l Shall I attack 1 '] General Scott did not fight that day, and there was no more occasion for my going up and perilling my men without an order, than of doing anything entirely uncalled for — not the slightest occasion for it. ****** * If General Scott did not fight, and saw the necessity for my acting, I repeat it was his business to give the order."
In another place he testifies :
" Question. When you found you were in no condition to detain Johnston, was it not all important that that fact should have been communicated to Gene- ral Scott; not the fact that you could not fight Johnston, but that you could not detain him, that your strength was insufficient for that, and that he could not rely upon his being kept back?
" Answer. I never supposed, for a moment, that General Scott believed for the fifty-fifth part of a second that I could hold him."
General Patterson further testifies :
" Question. You were not threatening Johnston at Oharlestown so as ta pre vent his joining Beaurega*d at Manassas ?
"Answer. No, sir. I remained there because I was ordered to remain in front of him until he left.
" Question. You knew at that time that you were not offering any obstacle to his going down to Manassas ?
" Answer. Perfectly : I knew I had not the means to do it.
CONDUCT OF THE WAR. T
"Question. Why did you not communicate that fact to General Scott imme- diately?
" Answer. I did communicate my condition, and where I was.
"Question. When]
"Answer. On the 16th I wrote him in detail from Bunker Hill. On the 17th I wrote again. And on the 18th. I gave him all the information necessary. And it was his business to order me, not my business to make any further sug- gestions to him.
" Question. Did you communicate to him by telegraph ?
"Answer. Certainly. I sent three telegrams to him on the same day.
" Question. On what day 1
"Answer. On the 18th, at half-past one in the morning, I telegraphed him my condition, and asked him if I should attack. To have sent further informa- tion to him would have been rather impertinent, and he would have so consid- ered it.
" Question. Why did you not inform him that you were not then in a condi- tion to offer any obstacle to Johnston's joining Beauregard ?
" Answer. I would have considered it rather a reflection on him to have told him so. He knew my condition."
General Scott testifies :
"But, although General Patterson waB never specifically ordered to attack the enemy, he was certainly told and expected, even if with inferior numbers, to hold the rebel army in his front on the alert, and to prevent it from re-enforcing Manassas Junction, by means of threatening manoeuvres and demonstrations — results often obtained in war with half numbers."
Instead of doing that, however, General Patterson came down to Bunker Hill, remained there over the day when he had been given to understand the advance would be commenced by General McDowell ; and early the next morning, with- out waiting to hear how far General McDowell had advanced, or whether he bad advanced at all, left the neighborhood of Winchester, where the enemy was, and turned off to Gharlestown, where, as he himself says, he had no means to offer any obstacle to Johnston's joining Beauregard whenever he chose. Johnston at once took advantage of the opportunity thus afforded him, and re-enforced Beauregard in season to inflict a defeat upon our forces at Bull Run.
Johnston started the greater portion of nis forces from Winchester on the 18th ; some of the testimony shows that a portion started on the afternoon of the 17th. General Patterson, though only some twenty miles distant from Winchester, and under orders to prevent the enemy from re-enforcing Beauregard, did not discover that Johnston had left Winchester until two days afterwards, when he tele- graphed, on the 20th, to General Scott that re-enforcements had left there.
In reference to deferring the attack upon Beauregard, when the arrival of Johnston's forces had become known, General McDowell says that the infor- mation that he received was too indefinite, mere rumor, and he could not tell how much credit to give to it. The arrival of the cars during the night preceding the battle was not certain evidence of the arrival of Johnston's forces; for it waa expected that re-enfofcements would be hurried up to the enemy from every direction possible. And he had been assured that " if Johnston joined Beaure- gard, Patterson should be on his heels."
General Scott testifies on that point :
"As connected with this subject, I hope I may be permitted to notice the charge made against me on the floors of Congress, that I did not stop Brigadier -General McDowell's movement upon Manassas Junction after I had been in- formed of the re-enforcement sent thither from Winchester, though urged to da
8 CONDUCT OF THE WAE.
so by one or more members of the cabinet. Now, it was, at the reception of that news, too late to call t)ff the troops from the attack. And, besides, though opposed to the movement at first, we nad all become animated and sanguine of success. And it is not true that I was urged by anybody in authority to stop the attack which was commenced as early, I think, as the 18th of July."
B. F. WADE, Chairman.
CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
BALL'S BLUFF.
The joint committee on the conduct of the war submit the following report, icilh the accompanying testimony, in relation to the battle of Ball's Bluff.
On the morning of Saturday, the 19th of October, 1861, General McOall, commanding a division in the vicinity of Washington, moved his entire com- mand, under orders from General McClellan, to Drainesville and its immediate neighborhood. A portion of his force was moved some miles beyond Draines- ville and within eight or ten miles of Leesburg, but was recalled to Drainesville, by order of General McClellan, about sunset of that day. The entire division of General William F. Smith was also sent out within supporting distance of General McCall.
General McCall testifies that he was directed to make reconnoissances in all directions, for three or four miles from Drainesville, noting particularly the char- acter of the country. About ten o'clpck on Sunday morning he informed General McClellan that he should not be able to get through his work that day, and received, in reply, " If you finish in the morning, return." *
On Sunday, the 20th, General McClellan directed a telegram to be sent to General Stone, at Poolesville, of which the following is a copy furnished your committee:
" Received October 20, 1861, from Camp Griffin.
" General McClellan desires me to inform you that General McCall occupied Drainesville yesterday, and is still there ; will send out heavy reconnoissances to-day in all directions from that point. The general desires that you keep a good lookout upon Leesburg, to see if this movement has the effect >to drive them away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them.'
"A. V. COLBDRN, " Assistant Adjutant General. " Brigadier General Stone, Poolesville.'9
On Sunday afternoon General Stone moved some forces to the bank of the river at Edwards's Ferry, and crossed over one or two companies to the Vir- ginia side, but very soon recalled them.
Colonel Devens, of the 15th Massachusetts, testifies that he received from General Stone, about one o'clock on Sunday, the following order :
" Headquarters Corps- of Observation,
"Poolesville, October 20, 1861.
"Colonel : You will please send orders to the canal to have the two new flat- boats now there opposite the island (Harrison's) transferred to the river ; and will, at three o'clock p. m., have the island re-enforced by all of your regiment now on duty at the canal and at the New York battery. The pickets will be replaced by the companies of the 19th Massachusetts there. " Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"CHA'SP. STONE,
•' Brigadier General. "Colonel Charles Devens,
" Commanding 15th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers."
About dark a verbal order was sent to Colonel Devens to send Captain Phil- brick, of his regiment, with a small party, across the river from Harrison's island, with directions to push out to within a mile of Leesburg, if possible, without
10 CONDUCT OF THE WAK.
being discovered, and then return and report. Captain Philbrick accordingly crossed, with, perhaps, fifteen or twenty men, at a place where he had crossed some time previously, when he had discovered that the river at that point was not picketed by the enemy. He landed at the foot of the bluff opposite Har- rison's island known as Bali's Bluff, ascended by a path that led to the top, and proceeded to reconnoitre as directed.
Before Captain Philbrick returned General Stone sent the following despatch to General McClellan, a copy of which was furnished your committee :
• "Headquarters Army op the Potomac, "Received Washington, October 20, 1861, from Poolesville.
" Made a feint of crossing at this place this afternoon, and at the same [time] started a reconnoitring party towards Leesburg from Harrison's island. Enemy's
fickets retired to intrenchments. Report of reconnoitring party not yet received, have means of crossing 125 men over in ten minutes at each of two points. River falling slowly.
" C. P. STONE,
" Brigadier General. ' "Major General McClellan."
Captain Philbrick pushed out some distance from the bluff, and then returned and reported that they had discovered a small camp of the enemy that did not appear to be very well guarded. This report was sent to General Stone.
Colonel Devens testifies that about midnight he received the following order from General Stone :
" Headquarters Corbs of Observation,
" Poolesville, October 20, 1861— 10 J p. m. " Special Order No. — .]
" Colonel Devens will land opposite Harrison's island with five companies of his regiment, and proceed to surprise the camp of the enemy discovered by Captain Philbrick, in the direction of Leesburg. The landing and march will be effected with silence and rapidity.
"Colonel Lee, 20th Massachusetts volunteers, will, immediately after Colonel Devens's departure, occupy Harrison's island with four companies of his regi- ment, and will cause the four-oared boat to be taken across the island to the point of departure of Colonel Devens. One company will be thrown across to occupy the heights on the Virginia shore, after Colonel Devens's departure, to cover his return.
" Two mountain howitzers will be taken silently up the towpath and carried to the opposite side of the island, under the orders of Colonel Lee.
" Colonel Devens will attack the camp of the enemy at daybreak, and, having
routed, will pursue them as far as he deems prudent, and will destroy the camp
if practicable, before returning. He will make all the observations possible on
the country ; will, under all circumstances, keep his command well in hand, and
, not sacrifice them to any supposed advantage of rapid pursuit.
•' Having accomplished this duty, Colonel Devens will return to his present position, unless he shall see one on the Virginia side, near the river, which he can undoubtedly hold until re-enforced, and one which can be successfully held against largely superior numbers. In such case he will hold on and report.
"CHAS. P. STONE, "Brigadier General.
** Great care will be used by Colonel Devens to prevent any unnecessary injury of private property ; and any officer or soldier straggling from the command for curiosity or plunder will be instantly shot.
"CHAS. P. STONE, "Brigadier General."
CONDUCT OF THE WAB. 11
Colonel Devens commenced crossing his force between 12 and 1 o'clock at night, and about 4 o'clock in the morning had crossed his five companies. He proceeded up the bluff and formed his command on the top of the bluff, and re- mained there until it was light enough to find his way. Colonel Lee also crossed with about 100 men and took position upon the bluff. Colonel Devens sent out scouts to the right and left, who reported that they could find no enemy.
At the first dawn of light Colonel Devers moved his command out in the direction of the supposed camp. Upon reaching the 'point to which the recon- noitring party of the night before had proceeded, it was discovered that what had been taken for a camp was a single row of trees, the dim light of the moon shining between them, below the branches, presenting the appearance of a row of tents.
Colonel Devens had advanced with his force to within about a mile of Lees- burg ; he halted his men there, and proceeded to examine the country about hia position as far as practicable. He sent word to General Stone that there had been a mistake about the camp of the enemy ; that he was well posted in a wood and concealed, and waited further orders. \
Not far from 7 o'clock in the morning a body of rebel riflemen was discovered to the right of Colonel Devens's position, in the direction of Conrad's Ferry ; Captain Philbrick with his company advanced towards them, when they fell back until they reached a ditch, under cover of which they halted and opened fire upon our men ; they were soon driven out of the ditch into a corn-field, where they obtained cover behind some stacks of corn. Another company was ordered by Colonel. Devens to the support of Captain Philbrick; but before they reached him some of the enemy's cavalry made their appearance from the direc- tion of Leesburg. The two companies were then ordered to fall back to the main body. /
About 8 o'clock Colonel Devens determined to fall back to the bluff, where Colonel Lee was, which was done in perfect order. He then reconnoitred the woods to his right and left, and discovering no appearance of the enemy, moved forward to his former position.
Between 8 and 9 o'clock the messenger of Colonel Devens returned from General Stone with instructions to him to remain where he was, and he would be supported. Colonel Devens testifies that it was either then or soon after that he was told that Colonel Baker was to come over and take command. He sent word to General Stone that he was discovered by the enemy, but could still hold his old position. About 10 o'clock the messenger returned with this message: "Very well ; Colonel Baker will cofaie and take command."
Colonel Devens states that while awaiting further instructions he directed his adjutant to ascertain the amount of the force with him ; the report was 28 officers and 625 men. He sent once or twice to the river to ascertain if re-enforce- ments were coming, and what he was to do, but he received no further order or message.
About 12 or 1 o'clock an attack was made upon Colonel Devens's force, which lasted some 10 or 15 minutes. Receiving no orders or message from the, river, he fell back about 60 yards, reformed his line and made dispositions to retire still further if necessary. And in perhaps an hour he fell back to the field Justin front of the bluff, where the main action afterwards took place. There he met Colonel Baker, who congratulated him upon the manner in which hifl men had conducted themselves.
In relation to the orders to Colonel Baker, General Stone testifies :
" I can give you all the early orders to Colonel Baker. I sent him an order,
about midnight on the 20th, to send the California regiment to Conrad's Ferry,
and have them there at daybreak, to await orders there ; to have the remainder
of his brigade roused early ; have a comfortable breakfast, and be in readiness
12 CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
to move at 7 o'clock in the morning. Late in the night — it might have been between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning. — I sent a cautionary order to Colonel Baker, knowing that volunteers make too much noise sometimes! to have that regiment march with silence and with unloaded guns. From that time I sent him no order."
General Stone testifies that between 8 and half-past 9 o'clock, when Colonel Baker was with him, and they had discussed the whole matter for some time, he gave him a written order to take the entire command of the right at Ball's Bluff. That order, with a communication from General Stone to Colonel Baker, sent some time later, was found upon his body after he was killed. The two papers are as follows :
11 Headquarters Corps of Observation,
"Edwards's Ferry, October 21, 1861.
" Colonel : In case of heavy firing in front of Harrison's island you will ad- vance the California regiment of your brigade, or retire the regiments under Colonels Lee and Devens now on the Virginia side of the river, at your discre- cretion, assuming command on arrival.
" Very respectfully, colonel, your most obedient servant,
" CHARLES P. STONE,
" Brigadier General Commanding. " Colonel E. D. Baker, ,
" Commanding Brigade.9'
"Headquarters Corps of Observation,"
Edwards's Ferry, October 22, 1861—11.50.
" Colonel : I am informed that the force, of the enemy is about 4,000, all told. If you can push them you may do so, as for as to have a strong position near Leesburg, if you can keep them before you, avoiding their batteries. If they pass Leesburg, and take the Gum Spring road, you will not follow far, but seize the first good position to cover that road. Their design is to draw us on, if they are obliged to retreat, as far as Goose creek, where they can be re-en- forced from Manassas and have a strong position.
" Report frequently, so that when they are pushed Gorman can come in on their flank.
" Yours, respectfully and truly,
"CHARLES P. STONE,
" Brigadier General Commanding. "Colonel E. D. Baker,
" Commanding Brigade."
Colonel Baker proceeded to Harrison's island, and finally concluded to send over troops to re-enforce Colonel Devens and Colonel Lee. One of the witnesses states that Colonel Baker was in doubt for a time whether to recall the troops al- ready over, or to re-enforce them ; but, upon hearing some one on the Virginia shore call out that they needed assistance, as the enemy were coming, he deter- mined to re-enforce them, and proceeded himself to the Virginia side, and as- sumed command. Colonel Baker directed the forces to cross at the point where Colonel Devens and Colonel Lee had crossed with their forces.
The means of transporting troops at BalPs Bluff was exceedingly limited. Between the Maryland shore and Harrison's island were only three flatboats or scows, all. together capable of crossing about 125 men at a time. On the Virginia side of the island there were at first only a Francis metallic life-boat and two small skiffs, together capable of carrying from 25 to 30 men at a time. After a time, one of the scows, or flatboats, was taken from the Maryland to the Virginia side of the island.
CONDUCT OP THE WAK. 18
The landing on the Virginia side was at the foot of a very steep bluff, up which a narrow path, widening towards the top, wound its way ; and on the top of the bluff was a cleared space, or field, bordered by woods, which afforded a cover to the enemy, until within a short distance of where our troops were formed.
Colonel Baker, according to the testimony, arrived on the field between one and two o'clock, and proceeded at once to form a line of battle upon the field at the top of the bluff. The amount of the force engaged upon our side was be- tween 1,700 and 1,800 men, consisting of about one-half of the 15th Massa- chusetts regiment under Colonel Devens; a portion (317 men) of the 20th Mas- sachusetts, under Colonel Lee; the Tammany regiment under Colonel Cogswell; and the California regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Wistar. The enemy's forces were about four thousand men.
The enemy began the attack — some of the witnesses say between two and three o'clock, others at three o'clock — at first, heavily, on the right of our line, then moving along towards the centre and left, where the hardest fighting took place.
Your committee do not deem it necessary to go into the details of the action. It continued for over two hours, our troops contending most bravely against greatly euperior numbers. Colonel Baker fell between four and five o'clock, having been most conspicuous for his bravery and almost reckless daring. When he fell the line began to waver, and some portions of it gave way, before the destructive fire of the enemy. ,
After the death of Colonel Baker the command devolved upon Colonel Cogs- well, of the Tammany regiment, who proposed to attempt to cut through to Edwards's Ferry, which was assented to by the other regimental commanders. Upon attempting a movement in that direction they were met by a Mississippi regiment coming from below, which opened a most destructive fire upon them. Our troops gave way, and retreated down the bluff towards the river. This was about dusk, so that our troops were somewhat concealed by the bushes on the side of the bluff. The enemy continued to fire upon them from the top of the bluff. The men attempted to escape to the island in the boats and by swimming, being exposed all the time to the fire of the enemy. The fiatboat was soon riddled ana sunk ; the life-boat drifted down the stream, and the skiffs were lost. Many were shot while in the water; others succeeded in swimming to the island ; some few, under cover of the darkness, succeeded in escaping along the bank of the riverj and finally reached our lines. But the greater portion were killed or taken prisoners.
In relation to the operations at Edwards's Ferry, under the supervision of General Stone and the immediate command of General Gorman, as there was no serious fighting there, it may not be necessary to go much into detail. The crossing was commenced about daybreak by the forces under Colonel Dana, of the 1st Minnesota regiment,, and was continued until some 2,500 men were crossed over that day. The means of crossing was very limited, as at Harri- son's Landing, consisting of three or four flatboats or scows, propelled across by poles. The place of landing was very good, and covered Dy our artillery • on the Maryland side. There were no important demonstrations made by our forces on the Virginia side of Edwards's Ferry. Some reconnoissances were made for a short distance, and one regiment of the enemy seen, probably the Mississippi regiment that arrived on the field at Ball's Bluff, near the close of the action there.
General McCall's division had remained at Drainesville all of Sunday and Sunday night. General McCall testifies :
" At six o'clock Monday morning I reported to him (General McClellan) that the engineers whom I had consulted reported to me that they would finish their work in two hours. I sent that express to General McClellan at six o'clock, and got his reply, dated eight o'clock, telling me to return as soon as the work was
14 CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
finished. I got his answer between nine and ten o'clock. I ordered the troops then to be ready to move, and as soon as the work was finished I returned to my camp under orders."
Both General McGlellan and General McOall testify that the movement to Drainesville was for the purpose of reconnoitering the country in that direction. But General Stone received no intimation of the object of the movement. On the contrary, the language of the despatch of Sunday might well lead him to believe that the movement had reference to driving the enemy from Leesburg. The despatch contained no intimation that General McCall was to be soon withdrawn from Drainesville. . He was directed " to keep a good lookout upon Leesburg to see if this movement has the effect to drive them (the enemy) away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them." General Stone made demonstrations both at Edwards's Ferry and at Ball's Bluff, and promptly notified General McClellan of what he had done. He sent that information on Sunday night, and he testifies that* he received no intimation from General McGlellan as to what he should do, whether to continue the demonstrations or not ; and received no intimation that General McCall was not close at hand to come to his assistance until about eleven o'clock on Monday night. It was a very general impression among the officers and men at Ed- wards's Ferry during Monday that General McCall would come to their assist- ance ; and General Stone testifies that he cautioned his artillery about firing upon any troops that might, show themselves in that direction lest they might fire upon our own forces.
In regard to that matter, General McClellan testifies as follows :.
" Question. Do you remember whether, or not, you informed him (General Stone) of the withdrawal of Smith and McCall to their former positions ?
" Answer. I think I did."
General Stone, (February 27, 1863,) after stating that, upon hearing of the death of Colonel Baker, he proceeded to Ball's Bluff, where he learned the full extent of the disaster, and at once determined to withdraw the troops at Edwards's Ferry, testifies as follows :
" And then, knowing that I could go myself quicker than anybody I could send, I turned my horse and galloped down to withdraw my troops at Edwards's Ferry back to the Maryland shore. I supposed at that time that I had about 2,500 men across the river ; and the reports I had heard opposite Ball's Bluff were that the army had been largely re-enforced, and they were then about 1.0,000 strong. I saw that there was great danger of Gorman being over- whelmed at Edwards's Ferry. I did not know whether McCall would be there to assist him or not. I was in utter ignorance in reference to him or his position.
" I at once commenced retiring my troops as quietly but as rapidly as I could, taking the precaution to have my artillery on the Maryland side so placed as to cover the troops on the Virginia side. The ground on the Maryland shore com- mands perfectly the ground on the Virginia shore there, and it would be an exceedingly dangerous thing for troops to advance and attack any body of men on the Virginia shore, directly at Edwards's Ferry, while the Maryland shore was well held by artillery.
" The moment I had given the orders for the retiring of those troops, I reported by telegraph to General McClellan, at Washington, that we had met with a repulse on our right, but I was doing the best I could to secure the left, and to retrieve. I am not quite sure now whether I telegraphed to General McClellan, before I went up to Harrison's island, that Colonel Baker had been killed, or whether I put that in the same despatch in which I informed him of the repulse.
" Having sent that information to General McClellan, I continued withdraw- ing the troops, watching carefully, so as to use the artillery for their protection/ if necessary. After some time — I cannot tell how long, for one takes but littlft
CONDUCT OP THE WAR. 15
0
note of time tinder such circumstances, but apparently as soon as a message could go to Washington and an answer be returned, (being carried by a courier on horseback four miles each way from the telegraph station to Edwards's Ferry) — I received orders from General McOlellan to this effect : * Hold all the ground you now have on the Virginia shore if your men will fight, intrenching, if necessary. You will be re-enforced.' Perhaps the words ' if your men will fight' came before the rest of the despatch ; and my impression is, though I will not be positive, that the words ' at all hazards' were used in the direction to hold all the ground on the Virginia shore.
" I am sorry that I have not possession of a single paper, telegraph or other- wise, of the records connected with my division. You know the way in which I was removed from my command. 1 was ordered to report myself here, in Washington, at once; and having not the slightest suspicion of why I was required here, I left all my papers as I would have done had I been going out for a two hours' ride ; and from that time to this I have never seen a single paper of any kind I then left behind me. I make this explanation to show why it is that I cannot speak positively about the language of despatches received and Bent ; why I cannot, perhaps, give their exact words.
"I saw all the danger in which my troops were on the Virginia side. But I supposed at that time that General McCall was very near there, and I took it for granted when General McClellan telegraphed me to hold my position on the Virginia side at all hazards, and that I should be re-enforced, that he had the means of immediately securing me.
" I cannot state positively when it was that I telegraphed to General Banks But my impression now is, that just as I started to go up to Ball's Bluff, when the news of Colonel Baker's death reached me, I telegraphed to General Banks, requesting him to send up a brigade. When I got to Harrison's Island, and before I returned to Edwards's Ferry, I despatched a messenger to meet what- ever brigade General Banks might send, ana conduct it to Conrad's Ferry, in- stead of to Edwards's Ferry, from which my despatch to General Banks was sent.
"And my impression is, that when I returned to Edwards's Ferry, and tele- graphed to General McClellan the fact of the repulse at Ball's Bluff, I sent another telegram to General Banks, that he better bring up his whole di- vision. I know I sent General Banks such a telegram; but at what time I will not be positive.
"Some time was lost in communicating with General McClellan, by my receiving a despatch, in cipher, of which I had not the key, frdm him or from his chief of staff. What the contents of that despatch were I have never learned. I immediately responded to it: 'I have received the box, but have no key;' What that despatch was, I have no knowledge of whatever; but I presume that the despatches which came Afterwards covered the same ground.
" I cannot state now, after so long an interval of time, at what hour I tele- graphed to General McClellan, urging that the re-enforcements should be sent to Goose Creek, on the Virginia side, supposing all the time that General McCall was not far off. The response to that, which I think I received about 11 o'clock on Monday night, was the first intimation I ever received that McCall had not all the time been near me. That despatch informed me that no reinforcements could reach me from the Virginia side, but that General Banks would re-enforce me from the Maryland side.
"Question. How far was General Banks from you? "Answer. He was about fourteen' miles in my rear.
" Question. Did that first despatch from General McClellan, promising you re-enforcements, contemplate* that they should come from General Banks ?
"Answer. Yes, sir; I suppose so. But at the time my idea was that McCall*
, was close by me. And I was led into an error, late in the evening, by receiving
a despatch from General McGlellan's headquarters, whether signed by him or
16 CONDUCT OF THE WAB.
his chief of staff, I do not now recollect, asking me if there was a road from 'Darnesville' to Edwards's Ferry. Now, there is no such place as 'Darnes- ville;' but there is a 'Drainesville.' And having in my mind that McCall was at Drainesville, I took it for granted that the operator had made a mistake, and had meant Drainesville instead of 'Darnestown,' which was the name of a
Slace in Maryland, and which proved to be the place meant. I replied to that espatch, to the best of my recollection, that there was a good road from Draines- ville to Edwards's Ferry. I presume that that caused some misconception at headquarters, because they undoubtedly had 'Darnestown' in their minds when they telegraphed 'Darnesville;' just as I had 'Drainesville' in my mind when I saw 'Darnesville' in the despatch. But that is not very important, only to show how errors will creep in.
" I think that by this statement I must remove any unpleasant impression with regard to my improperly exposing troops to disaster at Edwards's Ferry, since I acted under the .instructions of my superior officer; and also under the' impression that our forces under General McCall were near us on the Virginia side of Edwards's Ferry.
"Question. How happened it that you failed to make this statement, concerning those orders, on your former examination ?
"Answer^ Because I did not deem it proper to give any of the orders of my superior officer which he had not himself previously published or authorized me to use. The morning that I came before your committee I was instructed at General McClellan's headquarters that it was the desire of the general that officers giving testimony before the committee should not state, without his au- thority, anything regarding his plans, his orders for the movements of troops, or his orders concerning the position of troops. That covered this case.
" Question. Did you understand that to apply to past orders and transactions, as well as those to be executed in the future ?
"Answer. I did; because I could not know, and did not know, what orders to others were given cotemporaneous with those I received, and I might create wrong impressions by giving the orders I had received from my commanding general, unless there were at the same time produced cotemporaneous orders given to other generals. And I presume that the chairman will remember that I stated, when giving my testimony before, that I could not give any orders from my commanding general except such as he, himself, had made public.
"Question. Did General McClellan approve of the crossing at Edwards's Ferry and Ball's Bluff, on the 21st of October, 1861?
"Answer. T received a despatch from General McClellan in reply to one which I had sent him, informing him of the crossing of General G-orman and Colonel Baker ; that despatch to me commenced with these words : ' I con- gratulate you and your command.' I took that congratulation, on the fact of my having crossed, as an approval of the crossing ; and as I had received no information whatever concerning General McCall, in my own mind I supposed that it was but a simple thing of General McClellan in connexion with any other movements he might be making.
" Question. Was General McClellan informed of your means of transporta- tion for crossing troops ?
"Answer. Some time during the day — and I think it was in the same despatch in which he asked me for information of the enemy, and I should think that that despatch must have reached me about noon — General McClellan asked what means of transportation I had. I replied to hiin by telegraph, stat- ing the number and character of the boats at each crossing — at Edwards's Ferry and at Harrison's island." f
General McClellan testifies in reference to the crossing of General Stone 8 forces into Virginia :
" I have no recollection of any order which justified the passage of the river • in force; I am sure that I had no intention that he should do that."
CONDUCT OP THE WAR. 17
The events that occurred subsequently to the operations of Monday — the arrival of General Banks with his forces, the arrival of General McCleUan, and the final withdrawal of all our forces to the Maryland side of the river — are fully set forth in the testimony herewith submitted, and your committee do not deem any comments by them to be necessary.
In connexion with the battle of Ball's Bluff, two points remain to be consid- ered : First, whether a crossing was justifiable under any circumstances, con sidering the very insufficient means of transportation at the command of General Stone. Second, whether the forces under Colonel Baker could, and should, have been re-enforced from the Virginia side of Edwards's Ferry, when it was known that the troops under his command were engaged with the enemy.
In regard to the first point, all the testimony goes to prove that the means of transportation were very inadequate. The testimony of General Stone would seem to indicate that, while he was inclined to deem it sufficient, under what he understood to be the circumstances under which the movement was made, he left much to the judgment of others ; and this much can be said for him, that he received no intimation that a movement across the river would be expected from him, or would be justified, until the day before (Sunday) it was actually made. And the reasons that he had for supposing that other forces were within a short distance to render him assistance are set forth in the previous portion of this report.
In reference to re-enforcing Colonel Baker, the testimony is very conflicting. There is no question that it was known that the forces at Ball's Bluff were en- gaged with the enemy. The firing of musketry was distinctly heard at Edwards's Ferry, on both sides of the river. The only question is whether re-enforce- ments should have been sent under the circumstances, and whether there was any sufficient reason why they were not sent. General Stone testifies that he received no intimation from Colonel Baker that he needed re-enforcements ; that he received little, if any, information from Colonel Baker in reference to the condition and progress of affairs at Ball's Bluff; and he also testifies that, even if re-enforcements had been needed, they could not have been sent up on the Virginia side ; that the enemy had earthworks and batteries between Edwards's Ferry and Ball's Bluff, which would have made it extremely hazardous, if not impossible, to have sent any re-enforcements up by that route. Some of the other witnesses testify to the same effect. Others testify most positively that, so far as they were able to judge, there was no obstacle whatever in the way of our troops passing up on the Virginia side from Edwards's Ferry.
It cannot be denied that had re-enforcements promptly arrived at Ball's Bluff from Edwards's Ferry, the result of the battle there would, in all probability, have been greatly to our advantage, instead of being a most melancholy disaster. The evidence is so very contradictory that your committee refrain from express- ing any positive opinion upon that point, but allow each one to form his own conclusion from the testimony they have been able to obtain.
One other subject remains to be considered before closing this report — the ar- rest and imprisonment of General Stone. Your committee would have made no reference to that subject, but have submitted the testimony without comment upon their part, had it not been for the efforts that have been made by many to hold them responsible for all that has taken place in reference to the arrest of General Stone.
In the course of their investigation concerning the causes of the disaster at Ball's Bluff they obtained testimony, most unexpectedly to them all, which, without explanation, seemed 1*> impeach both the military capacity and the loyalty of General Stone. That testimony, as in every other instance that they deemed of importance, was brought to the attention of the proper authorities here, and the War Department was informed that, in the opinion of the com- mittee, a prompt investigation should be instituted. First, Secretary Cameron, and afterwards Secretary Stanton, were informed that the testimony before your
Part ii 2
18 CONDUCT OP THE WAR.
committee was of such a character that some explanation by General Stone was required.
General Stone was called to this city, and on the 31st of January, 1862, ap- peared before your committee, at the instance of General McGlellan, and stated that he had been informed that certain testimony before this committee affected him in such a way as to require his explanation. He was informed that there was testimony which might appear to impeach his conduct in the Ball's Bluff affair ; to show that he had had undue intercourse with the enemy, both by letter and by personal intercourse with their officers ; and also that he had permitted the enemy to erect formidable fortifications and batteries within reach of his guns, and which he could have prevented. The statement was made in general terms to General Stone, and without indicating who were the witnesses who had testified, in order that they should not be called to account by their commanding general for statements made before a committee of Congress.
In reply to this general statement upon the part of your committee General Stone proceeded to make an explanation in general terms. They then reported to the Secretary of War that the testimony upon the points to which his atten- tion had been called was conflicting. They made no recommendation as to what should be done, one way or the other; merely reported to him that the testimony was conflicting.
Not long afterwards they learned through the press that General Stone had been arrested, and sent to Fort Lafayette. The immediate cause of his arrest they did not know. They were satisfied that the information which they had furnished to the department had in all probability furnished some of the grounds upon which his arrest had been made; out they did not learn until more than a year afterwards what was* the immediate cause of his arrest at the time it was made.
General Stone was arrested on the 8th of February, 1862. On the 28th of February, 1863, General McClellan testified before your committee as follows :
" About ten days or two weeks before General Stone was actually arrested the Secretary of War gave me a written order to arrest General .Stone, for the reason that he had been informed by the members of the committee upon the conduct of the war that they had taken testimony going to show that General Stone had been guilty of conduct not consistent with loyalty. General Stone was removed from his command, and, I understood, appeared before this committee.
" Finally, on the very day of his arrest, a written report was made to me of the examination of a refugee from Leesburg, which, so far as. such a thing could, tended to corroborate some of the charges made against General Stone. I satisfied my own mind of the sincerity of this refugee by personal examina- tion, and then showed the statement to the Secretary of War, upon which he directed me to give the order to arrest General Stone immediately, and to send him under guard to Fort Lafayette. The order was carried into execution the same evening.,,
Since the release of General Stone he has been permitted by your committee, in consideration of the peculiar circumstances attending his arrest, to examine all the testimony which your committee have taken in reference to the admin- istration of his department, and to make as full a statement to the committee as he considered necessary. That statement, together with all the testimony, is herewith submitted.
It is due to General Stone that your committee should state that it appears, from documents before your committee, that immediately upon his arrest he demanded that he should be furnished with a copy of the charges against him, and be allowed the opportunity of promptly meeting them ; why his request was not granted youx>committee have never been informed.
B. F. WADE, Chairman.
TESTIMONY.
BULL RUN.
Washington, December 24, 1861. General J. B. Richardson sworn and examined.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. General, you accompanied the army to Bull Run, did you not ?
Answer. I commanded a brigade in that action.
Question. What time did you with your brigade leave your intrenchments ; that is, what time did you start ?
Answer. I started from Chain Bridge the morning of the 16th of July, I think.
Question. That was Monday morning, was it not?
Answer. I believe it was ; it was the 15th or 16th of July — about that time.
Question. At what time did you reach Fairfax with your brigade ?
Answer. We took the direct road to Vienna alone ; there we concentrated with the rest of General Tyler's division of four brigades ; mine was the second brigade of his division. We stayed one night at Vienna, and then moved to Germantown, where we stayed one night ; then, on the morning of the 18th, my brigade took the lead and moved on to Blackburn's Ford, on Bull Run, or Occoquan.
Question. What day of the week was that?
Answer. It was the morning of Thursday that we took the lead.
Question. And your brigade was in that first action at Blackburn's Ford ?
Answer. Mine was the only one that was engaged at Blackburn's Ford.
Question. Your four regiments ? ^
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What time on Thursday did you reach Blackburn's Ford ?
Answer. We reached within a mile of Blackburn's Ford with the brigade, I should think, about noon. We came to a halt a mija from the ford, finding the enemy in position there at their batteries. We came on top of a hill, where we could see aown the slope of a hill towards the batteries, and could see the men in the batteries.
Question. Did your brigade advance from that position nearer to the bat- teries?
Answer. Yes, sir. General Tyler directed me to make a movement with the brigade, in advance, to try and find the position and strength of the enemy, if possible. Accordingly I first moved on to the front a separate detachment of 160 skirmishers. At the same time two pieces of artillery (rifled 10-pounders) were brought into position on the top of the hill where we had arrived ; and soon after another battery (Captain Ayres's) of 6-poundcr guns and 12-pounder howitzers were brought into action. The skirmishers advanced until they came into action in a skirt of timber on this side of the run, in front of the enemy's position; and then I detached three other companies to their support, and two
20 TESTIMONY.
guns of Captain Ayres's battery, who moved np to the skirt of timber with two compauies of cavalry. They commenced fire from that point to assist the skirmishers, who were in the action already. I moved up to the timber myself, and proposed to General Tyler to form the four regiments in line of battle on the outside of the timber and move in.
Question. To charge upon the batteries ?
Answer. Yes, sir. The New York 12th, Colonel Walworth, was the nearest to where I was. I had it conducted in column of companies down the ravine, out of view, and near the position where I was in front of the timber, and had it deployed in line of battle in support of those that were in action already. I formed the New York 12th on the left of the battery, and directed Colonel Walworth to make a charge into the woods. I spoke a few words of encourage- ment to the regiment before they went on. I told them that it was a good regiment, and I expected they would do well. „ As soon as I had given this direction, I ordered up the Massachusetts 1st, through the same ravine, out of reach of jfche enemy's fire. The enemy could bring neither cannon nor musketry to bear upon them the way I brought them. I formed the 1st Massachusetts in line of battle on the right of the battery, then the 3d Michigan on the right of them, and then the 2d Michigan still to the right — all in line of battle. When I had finished putting the 2d Michigan on the line at the right, I moved back to see what had become of the New York 12th on the left. It had probably taken me as much as twenty minutes to go through with this forma- tion. 1 found, on arriving at the left, parts of two companies of the New York 12th, about sixty men altogether, retreating outside of the woods, carrying along a few wouuded. I asked them what the matter was, and where they were going. They said the regiment were all killed, and they were falling back ; that the rest of the regiment had fallen back — those that were not killed. Says I, "What are you running for? There is no enemy here; I cannot see anybody at all. Where is your colonel?" They knew nothing about it. They knew nothing about any of their officers. I could not find any officers with the men at all, I believe. The men halted and faced around, and then fell back again. The other three regiments, at the same time, were standing firm and ready to advance ; and the skirmishers, at the same time, held their
f round in the woods in front. I sent an aid to General Tyler to acquaint im of the retreat of the New York 12th, and he came down to see me. I proposed to him to rally the New York 12th in the woods as a support, and move on with the other three regiments against the batteries ; and I, at the same time, asked him where Sherman's brigade of his division was. They moved from camp at Germantown at the same time as we did in the morning, and we had been halted and in action at the place as much as two hours. He said that brigade had not yet arrived. General Tyler then said that it was not a part of the plan of battle to do anything more at that point than a mere demonstration — to make a reconnoissance to find the force of the enemy ; and, as I understood him, it was against orders to bring on a general engage- ment at that place. He then ordered me to fall back with the three regiments in rear of the batteries — not to undertake to rally the New York 12th. " Let them go," he said. So I accordingly fell back with the three regiments in rear of the batteries. I took the regiments back in eood order, without bring- ing them under the fire of the enemy's cannon at all. The enemy found that we had fallen back in rear of the batteries, and then they commenced the fire of their artillery again, which had been aimed at us to reach the woods in front As soon as they discovered we had fallen back, they directed the fire of their artillery against our batteries on the hill again, which were in their original position.
Question. One word right here : do you think you could have captured the enemy's batteries with your force if you had not fallen back?
TESTIMONY. 21
Answer. I think if the other brigades had come up to our support we could have done it.
Question. What number of men do you think you would hare lost in cap- turing those batteries i
Answer. We had already lost about 60 men, and I had the idea that by losing as many more we could have taken the batteries; because some of our skir- mishers had crossed the ravine, and one of them was so near that he was shot by the revolver of\ one of the enemy's officers; and another man killed dhe of the men at the guns inside the intrenchments, so he said, and the captain of the skirmishers — Captain Bernsneider — reported the same thing.
Question. Haa you captured that battery on Thursday night, and a general advance had taken place promptly on Friday morning, what, in your opinion, would have been the result?
Answer. We should probably have avoided their being re-enforced; have avoided the re-enforcements under General Johnston and General Davis, that took place by railroad on Friday and Saturday nights — they both came up during those nights ; we should probably have avoided altogether fighting on Sunday ; at least we should have probably turned Manassas by the rear before those re- enforcements had come up.
Question. So that, in your judgment, there would not have been a severe engagement at all had you captured that battery on Thursday night ?
Answer. No, sir. From what we have learned since, we find that they had probably a brigade of infantry opposed to us at first. But they continually in- creased their force until they had some 7,000 or 8,000 men in position.
Question. If your supports had come up ?
Answer. I think we could have carried the batteries, but we might not have been able to have retained them with one brigade.
Question. Precisely, I understand that. Was it your intention, when you formed your brigade in line of battle, to capture those batteries ?
Answer. Tes, sir. The musketry fire particularly was very heavy against us. After we had fallen back behind our batteries the head of General Sher- man's brigade came up, and I spoke to him. He asked me how many the enemy had in front. I told him they were strong there ; that they had, I thought, from 8,000 to 10,000 men, which turns out to have been nearly the case, from what we have heard since through their reports. The other three regiments of my brigade, besides the New York 12 th, remained as firm as I ever saw any regiments in the war with Mexico, at any time. No man thought of going to the rear. •
Question. All eager for a fight 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. After you had retired, as you have stated, you remained there until Sunday, did you 1
Answer. No, sir; we went back t<# Oentreville for the purpose of getting water and rations. There was no water near there that we had found then ; I had found some for myself and horse in a ravine, but I did not consider that there was enough for a brigade of troops. We fell back to Oentreville, and the next morning moved up again and dug for water and found it. We moved up to the same position in rear of the batteries, throwing out pickets in front of the position down towards the timber.
Question. How long did you remain at Oentreville ?
Answer. Over night only, and marched back at daylight.
Question. And you then remained in camp there till Sunday morning 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you take any part in the battle on Sunday ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
22 TESTIMONY.
By the chairman :
Question. Why was it concluded to fight that battle on Sunday, without any knowledge of where Patterson and his men were, and of the position of John- ston ? Did you know at the time where they were ? I will ask that first.
Answer. Yes, sir ; I knew General Johnston was on our right before we moved from there at all.
Question. On Sunday morning ?
Answer. Before we moved from the river I knew General Johnston was in that direction from this fact : About a week before we moved towards Bull Bun at all, I was ordered to make a reconnoissance from the Chain Bridge, on the road to Vienna, with a squadron of United States cavalry, to see whether it was a practicable road for artillery and wagons, for my brigade to move on to Vienna. Vienna is about eleven miles from Chain Bridge. I made the recon- noissance, and went a mile beyond Vienna, and found nothing but an abatis across the road where the enemy had been at work. Jt was probably a fatigue party who had gone back, giving up the idea of making an abatis there. I came back and reported to General McDowell. He told me tbat there was a meeting of the officers to which he read his instructions for carrying on that campaign, and wished to read me the plan which had been submitted to Gen- eral Scott, and which had not been disagreed to so far. He read over to me this plan, and stated to me the brigades and divisions which were to move on such and such roads. My brigade was to move to Vienna, and there was to join the other three brigades of General Tyler's division. General Tyler was then to move on to Germantown, where other divisions were to concentrate with his, and then, on getting to Gentreville, the whole army would move up on the roads to the left. He stated to me that each division was from 1 0,000 to 12,000 men strong, and that our division — Tyler's — would be a little the strongest, as it looked towards Johnston on the right. Johnston, he said, was in that direction. But General Scott thought that if Johnston moved towards Manassas, Patterson " should be on his heels," as he expressed it. Says I, " General, are there any cross-roads to communicate from the right of the line to the left, so that if one of these columns is attacked by two or three times its numbers, it can concentrate on any of the other columns, or any of the other columns can concentrate on it V* He said it was not known whether there were any cross-roads or not on which any troops could concentrate ; but that our columns were very heavy, and would be able to protect themselves. Since then we have found that there were abundance of cross-roads all through the country where troops could concentrate, if a person had been acquainted with them.
Question. Then when that battle was fought on Sunday it was expected that Johnston would be down ?
Answer. It was known that he was on our right.
Question. You expected he would participate in the battle?
Answer. I expected something all th6 time, for I asked General McDowell why this column of ours was stronger than any of the others — 12,000 instead of 10,000 — and he said because it looked towards General Johnston.
Question. Was there any insurmountable obstacle to tearing up that railroad •on which Johnston was expected to come down before the battle was fought ?
Answer. That was in front of our position, and we knew nothing of it. I did not even know there was a railroad there until I heard the cars running Friday find Saturday, both up from Richmond and down the other way. We heard .them running all night.
Question. If you had known of the road when you first advanced, would it not have been easy for a skirmishing party to have gone out and destroyed it, so that Johnston's army could not have come down there, at least <juite as con- veniently as they did 1
TESTIMONY. 23
Answer. I could not answer that, because I do not know the force Johnston had there.
Question. My idea was not to encounter a force, but for a scouting party to tear up the rails and obstruct the road.
Answer. Yes, sir ; but then they could have marched the distance in a day or night They could have come down part of the way by cars, and then marched the rest of the way.
By Mr! Chandler:
Question. These re-enforcements did not begin to arrive until Friday night, I understand you to say.
Answer. Friday and Saturday we heard the cars running all night. The next morning we spoke of it, and concluded that fifty car-loads had come.
By the chairman :
Question. I asked vou the question because I could not see why they came to the conclusion to fight that battle on Sunday, when they knew the disad- vantages to which they were subjected.
Answer. I knew nothing about the railroads there. I knew there were rail- roads -in the rear of Manassas that this army was intended to cut off, but where they were I did not know until I heard the cars.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. You took part in the battle on Sunday ]
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you remain at Blackburn's Ford ?
Answer. On Saturday there was a council of commanding officers of divisions and brigades, and I was called there, among the others, to hear the plan of at- tack for the next day. The main army was to move on the road to the right of Centreville and make their attack some three or four miles above where we were at Blackburn's Ford. These attacks the other officers would know more about than I do. My brigade was to remain in position in frQnt of Black- burn's Ford. It was not to hazard an engagement on any account whatever. I received written instructions to that effect in addition to verbal instructions. It was not to hazard an attack at all, but merely to make a demonstration with artillery, and perhaps skirmishers, but nothing more than a demonstration. If necessary, the positions were to be intrenched by abatis or earthworks thrown up on the road according to the discretion of the commanding officers.
By the chairman :
Question. What, in your judgment, led to the disasters of that day?
Answer. I will state all I know about it, and then I can draw some conclu- sion afterwards.
Question. Of course ; that is all I expect. •
Answer. The other three brigades of General Tyler's division were detached to make an attack to my right. They were to be in action by daylight in the morning, and as soon as I heard the report of his artillery I was to commence • the fire, with my artillery, on the front. At the same time my brigade was de- tached from General Tyler'B command, and, together with the brigade of General Davies, of New York, and the brigade of General Blenker, we were constituted three brigades of the reserve under Colonel Miles, of the United States army. I was to consider myself under his command. I waited until some 8 or 9 o'clock in the morning of Sunday before I heard the artillery on my right.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. The attack was to have commenced at daylight 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I said to the officers the night before— to General Tyler
24 TESTIMONY.
especially — " It is impossible, general, to move an army of regular troops under two hours, and you will take at least that time to move volunteers; and if re- veille is not beaten before two o'clock in the morning you cannot get into action at daylight; it is impossible." Said I, "If you beat reveille at 12 o'clock, with volunteer troops, you may get into action at daylight, but not before ; that is the best you can do." Other officers heard me, I have no doubt, but I addressed myself particularly to General Tyler, as he had been my commanding officer. I waited until 8 o'clock in the morning before I heard a gun firejj. on the right, and then I commenced a cannonade on the enemy's line with my artillery, About this time Colonel Davies came up with his brigade, and inquired the date of my commission as colonel, and told me his, and found he ranked me eleven days. He took command of the two brigades. At the same time I showed him my position in front of Blackburn's Ford. He wished a good position for artillery to play. I took him to a hill some 600 yards on our left, with a ravine between, and showed him a good position for his battery to operate on a stone- house, in front of us about a mile, which was said to be the enemy's head- quarters, and which our rifled ten-pounder guns could easily reach. He im- mediately took up that position, which was at a log-houfee on this hill to our left, which was fully as high, and. a little higher, than the hill we were on. We kept up a fire from two batteries of artillery until 11 or 12 o'clock in the day-— per- haps until noon. About that time Colonel Miles showed himself to us. He came to a log-house where I was, near my position — for there was a log-house there also— on the top of the hill. I showed him that re-enforcements were coming in in front of us. In fact, before he came I had reported to him that some three bodies of men had already come into the intrench men 1 8 in front of us. One bodv was probably two regiments, and the others were one regiment each — as much as that. They appeared to come from off in a direction xto wards the south. That was about 12 o'clock in the day. Colonel Miles came down himself, and I showed him, with a glass I had, the bayonets of some of the men coming in front of us on the road — the last detainment. I will say here that they did not answer with cannon at all in front of us that day. Colonel Miles then went away. In the forepart of the afternoon he came back again, and said that he did not believe the enemy were in front of us. At the same time, between these two visits, we could see men moving in the direction of Manassas, up towards the attack in front, which was then going on ; and about that time the enemy were also falling back. After they had advanced from Manassas, they then fell back in great disorder along the roads.
Question. That was in sight of your guns 1
Answer. Yes, sir. We opened upon them with a ten-pounder rifled gun from our position. Colonel Miles at that tiine said that he believed they were retreat- ing towards Manassas, and that he thought we could force the position in front of us, and that we had better go down and try "to drive them out," as he expressed it. Said I, " Colonel Miles, I have a positive order in my pocket for this brigade not to attack at all." I took it out and showed it to him. Says he, " That is positive." And he said nothing more about making an attack then ; but he proposed throwing out a few skirmishers. We threw out 160 skirmishers, and I think three other companies in support of them. They moved down to the edge of the woods, and then the advance of the skirmisher^ were driven in by a volley of musketry right off. I then ordered the skirmishers back, satisfied that the enemy were there in considerable force. About the time that was over we could see batteries of horse artillery and bodies of cavalry and infantry moving in large force back again towards the Stone Bridge, which was some three or four miles from us. Lieutenant Prime, of the engineers, had at that time been down with a party of skirmishers to see if he could find any place where we could make a good attack in front. He came back and made the ob- servation at that time that before night Centreville would be our front instead
TESTIMONY. 25
of our rear; as much as to say that we had got to change oar line of battle ; that we were beaten on the right. I had thought about noon that it might be necessary for us to repel an attack. I got together a party of pioneers, about forty, and I had about sixty axe-men detailed from the Michigan regiments, to use all the axes and spades we had. I commenced to make an abatis of heavy timber between my position and Colonel Davies, on my left. I also threw up an intrenchment across the road, with rails and dirt, to sweep the road in front of us. I knew the enemy, if they attacked our position, must go through the woods in column on our Qght, and would have to deploy under our fire, and move up against our battery which I had put in the road. We worked on that abatis until about two hours before night, when we had it completed, and I considered the position safe. The timber was very heavy; some of the pieces were two feet in diameter ; nothing could possibly get through it. I had it completed as far as Davies's position two hours before sunset, and I took him over to look at it. It met with his views completely. About two hours before sunset I heard heavy firing of musketry, and of artillery also, near Davies's brigade, on my left. An officer came over and informed me that the enemy had made an attack with a column of infantry, some 5,000 strong, on Davies's posi- tion ; that he had caused his infantry to lie down in support of his guns ; that Hunt's battery had opened with canister shot, and fired some forty rounds, and that the enemy had fallen back in confusion, and that in five minutes not one man was in sight. They came across Bull Run on our left, and to the left of Hunt's battery. They came up a ravine leading towards his battery, and ljad come within 300 yards before they were seen. They were then a dense mass of men, and the officers were trying to deploy them in line of battle. They were within 300 yards, the most effective distance for canister shot. Major Hunt immediately opened his battery, and fired some forty rounds of canister shot, when the enemy fell back. That was reported to me about two hours be- fore sunset. At the time this firing was going on, an officer of Colonel Miles 's staff came to me and ordered -my brigade to retreat on Centreville. Notwith- standing I had been ordered by General McDowell to hold this position at all hazards, still, as I was under Colonel Miles's direct authority, I could not disobey the order, and so I put the brigade in march.
Question. You had repulsed the enemy when this order was given ?
Answer. Colonel Davies had repulsed them. We did not know how that had turned them. On getting within some three-quarters of a mile of Centre- ville with my brigade I met Colonel Davies, and asked him what the object of this movement was. He said he did not know. I asked him if the enemy had attacked him on our left. He said they had, and that he had repulsed them handsomely. But the object of this movement he knew nothing about. On getting within three-quarters of a mile of Centreville, some officer of General McDowell's staff ordered me to put my brigade in line of battle, facing both the road from Centreville to Blackburn's Ford and the road from Centreville to Union Mills, which was about four miles on the left of Blackburn's Ford, and try to hold that position, if possible. I put the brigade in position, leading from between the two roads, and on some slight hills that commanded the ad- vance in front. While I was busy in putting my brigade in line of battle, I found that a great many other regiments of different brigades had been formed in line of battle both on my right and my left. Some of my regiments I placed in line of battle, and some in close column by divisions, to be ready to repel an attack of cavalry which might be made down the road, as I supposed the enemy's cavalry would come first in advance of the infantry. Soon after making this disposition, T found that some of my regiments had been moved from the position I had placed them in, and deployed into line ; among others, the third Michigan. I inquired the reason of it, and Colonel Stevens, of the third Michigan — lieutenant colonel of that regiment-— came to me about that
25 TESTIMONY.
time and inquired of me particularly why his regiment had been deployed from the position of close column by divisions into line of battle. He said that Colonel Miles had directed the movement. He said he wished to know which to obey, whether to obey Colonel Miles or me. I told him he had no business to move that regiment without the order came through me. He said he did not know what to do. Says I, " What is the matter ? " Says he, " Colonel Miles comes here continually and interferes ; and," said he, " we have no confidence in Colonel Miles." Said I, " Why ? " " Because," says he, " he is drunk.-' Soon after this conversation, Captain Alexander— now Colonel Alexander of the gen- eral staff and corps of engineers— came up tome and said that General McDowell intrusted the whole disposition of the troops around that point to me. I told him I could do nothing as long as I was continually interfered with by a drunken man. ,1 told him that Colonel Miles was drunk, and that he was eon* tinually changing everything that I did. He said that General McDowell knew that Colonel Miles was drunk, and that that would soon be attended to, and to go on and make my disposition of the troops. Several batteries of artillery had been placed in position on the hills, but I think the line of battle did not reach from one road to the other ; it was too long a distance between them. That is to say, we were too far in advance. But there were also some hills be- hind us which were a little higher than the ground we stood on. Colonel Alex- ander said that the present fine of battle was not a good one, and he would propose throwing back the right and left so that they could reach from one road to the other, and have the right flank rest on some woods on one road, and the left flank rest on some woods on the other road, and thus be secured against cavalry. I told him that I would make that disposition as fast as I could, as I believed it was better than the first one. The first disposition had been di- rected by Colonel Miles. I had the batteries of artillery with Major Barry, who was the chief of artillery at that time, massed in the centre and placed on these commanding hills ; and I had the line of battle formed in front of the guns in a hollow, the batteries being high enough to play over the men's heads. The men were in the ravine in front, covered from the enemy's fire if they should come up. I considered that they were completely covered, and could not be hurt until the enemy came into close action, while, at the same time, our batteries could not be carried at all until the enemy came within sixty yards of our muskets. Of course our artillery had full sweep in the commanding posi- tion it had, which I considered the best position I could place our line in. I considered it a better line than the first because it was shorter, and at the same time our men were better protected.
By the chairman :
Question. We do not care so much about the particulars.
Answer. I want to show why the second line was better than the first, be- cause it has been brought in evidence to show that the first line was better than the second. At the same time not all the infantry were placed in this position. Battalions in column closed in mass were placed behind the intervals of the bat- talions in front for support, so that we actually had two lines of battle instead of one, having more force to it than the first line that was formed.
Question. What happened to this line ?
Answer. While I was going on with this General McDowell rode up to me. Said he, "Great God, Colonel Richardson, why didn't you hold on to the posi- tion at Blackburn's Ford?" I replied, "Colonel Miles ordered me to retreat to Centreville, and I obeyed the order." General McDowell said nothing more, except to take the general command of the troops. I said to him, " Colonel Miles is continually interfering with me, and he is drunk, and is not fit to com- mand." I understood him to say that he had already relieved him from com- mand, and desired me to go on with the preparations; that I had charge of all
TESTIMONY. 27
the troops at that point. I told him I would go on with the preparations as fast as I could. About half an hour before sunset when the lines were complete, the head of the enemy's cavalry made its appearance through the woods on the road towards Blackburn's Ford. I believe I was the first officer that saw that cavalry. I was standing by the side of a battery of 10-pounders, with a young lieutenant of artillery— Lieutenant Benjamin— 1 think be commanded the bat- tery. Says I, "There is the head of the enemy's cavalry; you open on them with your two guns immediately and as fast as you can." He had his guns fired — I think it was twice each— on the head of the enemy's cavalry, and they fell back and we saw nothing more of them. The shells appeared to take effect, for they retreated immediately. Just before this Colonel Miles came up to where I was. Said he, "Colonel Richardson, I don't understand this." I was marching the 3d Michigan regiment over to the right at that time to fill up a space between them and the next regiment. Says he, "You should march that regiment more to the left." Says I, "Colonel Miles, I will do as I please; I am in command of these troops." Says he, " I don't understand this, Colonel Richardson." Says I, " Colonel Miles, you are drunk," and I turned away to lead off my men. Says he, "I will put you in arrest" SayB I, "Colonel Miles, you can try that on if you have a mind to." I led the regiment on and placed them in position. He watched me, but said nothing more. At that time he could hardly sit on his horse. I could see from his reeling in the saddle, from his incoherent language, and from his general appearance, that he was drunk. I had been acquainted with Colonel Miles long before.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. He had command of those three brigades through the day ?
Answer. Yes, sir; the reserve.
Question. Why were they not ordered, or one brigade of them ordered, in front instead of being kept in the rear?
Answer. I have always thought that if Blenker's brigade, which was at Cen- treville, had been brought up to support me at my right — Davies's brigade was already on my left; and had just repelled the enemy — we could have held that position until morning, when Runnion's reserve of 10,000 men at Fairfax Sta- tion eould have come up. Some of his reserve had already arrived that night, and the rest of the reserve— among others the 37th New-York, which is in my brigade now — was at Fairfax. They could have moved up against the morn* ing, and then we should have been 24,000 strong, with the 35 guns which we had saved on the field already. They certainly could have held the position which I had held for three days alone.
By the chairman :
Question. Do you know any reason why that disposition was not given to the troops 1
Answer. I cannot say why it was not made. But I have always thought that if a battery of artillery and some cavalry had been placed in the road at Centreville, so as to have opened on the fugitives, they could have been rallied at that place. I knew of something having been done once before like that. I know that at Buena Vista — although I was not there—some troops ran from Buena* Vista as far as Saitillo, and Major Webster, who had command of two 24-pounder howitzers at Saitillo, loaded his guns and threatened to fire on them if they went any further ; and they stopped at that place.
Question. Then you consider that Colonel Miles's order to you to retreat from the position you had fortified, while Davies had repulsed the enemy
Answer. I think if Blenker's brigade had been brought up on our right we eould have held our position until morning, when a further reserve could have re-enforced us. And then, by cutting the timber in that direction, in two or
28 TESTIMONY.
three hours we could have made a position that we Could have held. At the same time there is another thing I would like to say. From what we have learned since, the enemy handled every reserve they had, whereas our reserves were not handled at all. The three brigades of reserves — Blenker's, Davies's, and mine — that were on the field that day, and Runnion's reserve, which was at Fairfax Station, six miles off, I believe, and not handled at all, make 24,000 men who were useless, whereas the enemy handled all their reserves. This is nothing new. I said the same thing that night.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Runnion's reserve was only six miles off, you say ?
Answer. At Fairfax Station.
Question. How many men t
Answer. Ten thousand.
Question. So that in reality there came under fire in that battle about 16,000 of our troops ]
Answer. O ! more than that We marched 50,000 men and 49 pieces of ar- tillery, of which we saved 35 pieces.
Question. So that about 26,000 were actually under fire t
Answer. I do not like to state about that.
Washington, D. C, December 24, 1861.
General Samuel P. Hbintzelman sworn and examined. By the chairman :
Question. One item of the inquiry which we are commissioned to make is in regard to the occasion of the disaster at Bull Run, as near as we can ferret it out, by questioning military gentlemen who know. You will therefore please state in your own way, without much questioning, what you know about it ; the time of starting, where you went, what you did, and what observations you made. State it in general, for we do not wish to descend to particulars at alL Just state your opinion of the causes of the disasters at Bull Run.
Answer. I cannot recollect when the other divisions started. My division marched on the morning of the 16th of July, which was Tuesday.
Question. You can give us a very rapid and general narrative, if you please, of what happened from the marching of your division. You need not be minute or particular in your statements.
Answer. The first brigade of my division started at 10 o'clock in the morn- ing, and in the course of the day the whole division marched. We went ts far as the Pohick the first night.
Question. How many men were in your division ?
Answer. About 9,500. The last of the division did not get into camp until about one hour before daylight. We started the next morning soon after day- light, and found the road somewhat obstructed. When we got to Elzey's, I sent Wilcox's brigade on to Fairfax Station, and Franklin's brigade towards Sangster's, while I remained with ours at Elzey's. Just before we got to Elzey's we met some of the enemy's pickets, and received information that they had batteries at Fairfax Station, as well as between us and Sangster's. In about a half an hour I got word from Wilcox that the enemy were retreating from Fairfax Station. I immediately sent that information to General Franklin and followed on with the other brigade. I got to Sangster's with my two bri- gades late in the afternoon, and sent out reconnoitring parties, but could hear nothing of the enemy, further than they had retreated, some two hours before
TESTIMONY. 29
we got to Sangster's, along the railroad, and had burned the bridges. We saw the smoke of the burning bridges when we got there. We stayed there all the next day. General McDowell came there about 12 o'clock, and we had a con- versation there. The intention was, when we started, to go by the left flank to Wolf Run Shoals, or to Brentsville, and endeavor to cut the railroad in rear of Manassas. But from information received at Sangster's it was not considered feasible to follow up that plan. So he gave me orders to be at Centreville with my division between that time and daylight, and to get some provisions. Our N three days' rations were out that day.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. That was on Thursday.
Answer. Yes, sir. We started on Tuesday and got to Pohick. On Wednes- day we got to Sangster's, and we stayed there until late in the afternoon of Thursday. About 5 o'clock, I think it must have been, I started. I had sent out to get beef, but could get nothing but an old cow ; and we then went on without any provisions. We got to Centreville about dark, and found the rest of the army encamped about the place.
Question. That was Thursday night.
Answer. Yes, sir. We remained there until Sunday morning, when I ad- vanced with the rest of the army.
By the chairman :
Question. What induced you to fight that battle on Sunday, and at that time, without knowing more particularly what Johnston and Patterson were about?
Answer. On Saturday we saw re-enforcements to the enemy arriving by the railroad, which we supposed were Johnston's. And every day's delay we knew was fatal to our success.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Can you tell us why you laid over at Centreville from Thursday until Sunday ?
Answer. The day after we left Alexandria the provision train was to start. The wagons had not yet been collected, as I understood, and the consequence was that they did not start the next day, but the day after. On Thursday the provisions I had gave out. In fact, some of the • men had got rid of their pro- visions the very first day ; like volunteers, they did not take care of them, and as they got heavy they threw them away. I sent two or three times in the course of the morning, and finally I sent an officer to follow up until he found them. He went clear into Alexandria, and there he learned that the train had started the second day after we left, instead of the first, and had taken the road to Occoquan. As soon is I learned that, I pushed on towards Centreville, to try to get there before dark. At Centreville^ we the next day got some pro- visions. There was a reconnoissance made on Friday, or one attempted ; but they met some of the enemy's pickets, and had to come back. There was another attempt made the next day, but I do not think they learned much then. But the supposition was that the enemy was in force at the Stone Bridge ; that they had a batfery there, and an abatis, and that the bridge was ruined ; and that they had a force further up Bull Run at another ford, probably about half- way between Centreville and Sudley's Church. You asked me about the delay. The delay at Centreville, I suppose, was principally waiting for provisions, and for information of the position of the enemy.
Question. And during that delay Johnston's army came down ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And likewise re-enforcements from Richmond t
Answer. Yes, sir; I suppose from every quarter whence they could send them.
80 TESTIMONY
i By the chairman :
Question. Your first idea was the best one to cut off that railroad, was it not ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; we supposed the creek was not fordable but at few places ; but at Sangster's we got information that satisfied us that there were very slight obstructions, and it would make that operation a very dangerous one, and it was given up.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Will you give us, as succintly as possible, the operations of your division on Sunday ?
Answer. I perhaps had better state what occurred Saturday night.
Question. Very well.
Answer. Saturday night all the division commanders were directed to appear at General McDowell's Headquarters to receive instructions what to do the next day. The order had been given to march, first, at 6 o'clock the afternoon of Saturday ; but afterwards it was put off till 2 o'clock the next morning. We went there and got our instructions. General Tyler's division was to start first ; then Hunter's, and then mine. I asked a few questions about what I was to do, and had some little change made about the hour of starting, and went back to my tent. The next morning, precisely at the hour fixed, I left. The head of the column got to Centreville, and found the road obstructed with troops. General Tyler's division had not passed yet. I waited there three hours for Tyler's* and Hunter's division to pass. After crossing Cub Run a little ways we took the right-hand road. MTajor Wright, of the engineers, went with Hunter's column. He was to stop with the guide, where the road turned off to this second ford I spoke of. He could not find the road, and of course we kept on and reached Sudley's Church, or Bull Run, near the church, about 11 o'clock on the morning of Sunday. In the meantime we heard the firing on our left, across Bull Run, and could see the smoke, and could see two heavy clouds of dust, evidently caused by troops approaching from Manassas. A few minutes before we got to Bull Run General McDowell and his staff passed us, going on ahead. When we got to the run the last brigade of Hunter's division had not yet crossed. I ordered the first brigade of my division to fill their canteens, while I went on to see with my glass what was going on. About this time the firing in front of Hunter's division commenced. And in about a half an hour two of General McDowell's staff rode up and asked me to send forward two regiments, that the enemy were outflanking Trim. I ordered forward two regiments. The Minnesota regiment was one, but I have forgotten the other. I followed on and left orders for the rest of the division to follow as soon as the road was clear. Major Wright led the Minnesota off to the left, and I followed the upper road on the right until we t&me on the field. I stopped and made inquiries as to what was going on. I saw General McDowell, and the batteries which were on this ground. Two of them were ordered forward ; one of them flanking my division. I followed them for a little while, sending orders for the zouaves and first regiment to follow and support them. I went up, after the zouaves arrived, on the right of the batteries with them. As I rose to cross the ridge, I saw beyond a line of the enenty drawn up at a shoulder-arms, dressed in citizen's clothes. It did not strike me at first who they were. But I just checked my horse and looked at them. I saw in an instant that they were a party of the enemy's troops, and I turned to the zouaves and ordered them to charge them. They movea forward some 20 paces and they fired, and both parties broke and run. Just at this moment some 30 or 40 of the enemy's cavalry came out through an old field and charged the rear of the zouaves. The zouaves turned upon them and emptied some five or six saddles, and the cavalry broke and run. Captain Colburn's company of cavalry, belonging to the regular army, was close by and got a shot at them with their
TESTIMONY. 31
carbines, and emptied some more saddles. That was the last I saw of them. And that was the famous black horse cavalry who made the charge.
Question. Only thirty or forty of them?
Answer. That was all. I did not see that many, but I was told there were thirty or forty of them. There was not a black horse among them that I saw. And there was one solitary man killed of that regiment by that fire. There was also a man fell out of the leading company. One of them disappeared, and I supposed he crawled off.
By the chairman :
Question. How far apart were they when that firing took place?
Answer. Thirty or forty yards.
Question. And they all fired over each other's heads ?
Answer. The enemy were in the woods. As I was on horseback of course I saw them first. I stopped and ordered the zouaves to charge. By coming forward a few paces they could see over the ridge, and as soon as they saw each other they fired and then they both broke and run.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Did the zouaves rally after that during the day? Answer. Not as a regiment. Many of the officers and men joined other regi- ments, or fought on their own hook.
By the chairman :
Question. What, in your opinion, really led to the disasters of that day?
Answer. It is hard to tell. There were a number of causes. In the first place, the delay of Friday and Saturday at Centreville was one efficient cause. Another cause was the three hours lost at Centreville on Sunday morning.
Question. Did their troops outnumber ours, do you suppose?
Answer. 0 ! yes, sir, largely. I have no definite information as to the number of men they had. General Tyler's division went first, then General Hunter's, then mine. Hunter had furthest to go; the distance I had to go was the next furthest, and the distance Tyler had to go was the least. I think if we had reversed it — let Hunter start first, then let me follow him, and then Tyler follow me — that delay at Centreville would not have occurred.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Suppose the battery at Blackburn's Ford had been captured on Thursday night by Tyler's division, and an advance had been ordered on Friday morning, do you think there would have been much of a battle any way?
Answer. That is a difficult question to answer; I do not know what force the enemy had there. I doubt whether Tyler could have captured that batteiy . From what I have learned, I do not think he had sufficient force to do it. And he had no authority to make such a strong demonstration as he did.
By the chairman :
Question. Why was not the reserve brought up to that field?
Answer. Thq rf serve at Centreville? *
Question. Yes, sir.
Answer* I suppose the only reason was that Centreville was such an im- portant point. If the enemy should get possession of it we should be cut-off entirely. I think that when we found on Saturday that re-enforcements were coming in so strongly, the reserve at Alexandria, here on the Potomac, should have been brought forward. That would have left the reserve that remained at Cen- treville in a position to be used.
Question. There were a great many troops at Fortress Monroe that might have been brought up, I should think. What prevented that ?
82 TESTIMONY.
Answer. I do not think there were many at Fortress Monroe. I do not re- collect. I think there were troops enough around Washington, if they had been pushed forward on Saturday.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. And, probably, if the battle had been made on Thursday or Friday, before their re-enforcements came up, you had force enough ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I believe we should have been successful, at least, in get- ting possession of and holding Bull Run, if we could have advanced Friday morning. I was perfectly confident, when I went there on Thursday night, that we should advance on Friday morning, and the consequence was that I camped my division in very close order.
By the chairman :
Question. It always seemed singular to me that you went into battle on Sunday morning, when you found Johnston had re-enforced them. I should have sup- posed that you would have remained at Centreville until you had got your re-enforcements up to meet the new state of things.
Answer. I did not think, when we started on Sunday morning, that there would be a general engagement I supposed, from what we were informed at head- quarters, that the enemy had a strong force at the Stone Bridge, as the rebels called it, and a small force at the ford I was to go to. I had orders not to cross until Hunter had crossed at Sudley's Church and come down opposite to me on the other side of Bull Run. Then I was to cross, and we were to follow on down opposite the Stone Bridge, and turn that. Tyler had orders, I believe, not to attack with his infantry at all, but merely to make a demonstration with his artillery at the Stone Bridge, and to wait until we came down. But when we crossed over there, we soon got engaged with a heavy force of the enemy.
Question. There was really no necessity for fighting on Sunday rather than on any other day. You chose your own time, I suppose ?
Answer. It is reported that they had given their orders to attack us on Sunday morning at eight o'clock.
Question. Then I would have remained on the heights at Centreville and let them attack us there, and then they would have lost the benefit of their batteries.
Answer. The principal difficulty was the want of provisions in kind. I think that was one grand cause of the disaster. And the troops were not brigaded in time. And then we had a great many three months men.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. You have been in command of the extreme left wing of this army for some time, I believe ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; between two and three months. I was on the left all last summer ; but the day, or two days, before the battle my position was changed. I was to follow out on the Little River turnpike ; and then they changed me further to the left, to go up the Fairfax road.
Washington, D. C, December 26, 1861. General William B. Franklin sworn and examined.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. You were in the battle of Bull Run, were you not ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. In command of a brigade ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
TESTIMONY. 33
Question* Were you in a council of war that decided upon delivering that battle of Ball Ban ?
Answer. I was not.
Question. Do you remember the time at which you started, with your brigade, for Bull Bun?
Answer. We started the Tuesday before the battle ; the battle was fought on Sunday.
Question. Will you state, briefly as possible, the daily marches of your brigade— the daily operations of your brigade— from that Tuesday until Sunday morning following ?
Answer. On Tuesday we marched from our camp, near Alexandria, to Pohick creek, a distance of about fourteen miles, and there encamped. The next morn- ing we marched to gangster's Station ; that was on Wednesday. Then on Thursday afternoon we marched from Songster's to Centreville, and there en- camped. There we laid until Sunday morning, at 2 J o'clock, when we marched to Bull Bun.
Question. Can you tell why the army was delayed at Centreville from Thurs- day evening until Sunday morning ? why a forward movement was not made at once ?
Answer. I can only do that from inference ; I have no direct information from headquarters. My impression is that it was on account of the non-arrival of the* supplies for the army until some time on Saturday.
Question. The non-arrival of provisions ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Which division of the army was your brigade connected with on that Saturday morning 1
Answer. I belonged to General Heintzelman's division.
Question. Will you very briefly give us the particulars of your march on Sunday?
Answer. We left camp at 2£ o'clock in the morning, and marched about three-fourths of a mile, until the road that my brigade was on intersected the Warrenton turnpike. There we waited until nearly 6 o'clock for the passage of General Hunter's division. As soon as that had passed we started forward and turned off from the Warrenton turnpike just beyond Gub Bun, and reached Bull Bun, at Sudley's Stream, between 11 and lg o'clock. At that time the engagement commenced. I was directed to send forward Bicketts's battery, which I did, and posted it where I was ordered to do so ; and I immediately sent forward the 1st Minnesota regiment to a position indicated by Captain Wright, of the engineers. I then sent forward the 5th Massachusetts regiment to support Bicketts's battery, and immediately afterwards the 11th Massachu- setts, the remaining regiment of my brigade, was brought up and took position alongside of the 5th Massachusetts, to be available for the fight wherever it might be needed. Bicketts's battery commenced firing and was doing excellent execution. I saw it presently move off from the position where I had stationed it without any orders from me. As I saw it move off I moved the 5th and 11th Massachusetts up to be in a position to support, in case it should get into difficulty. But it was taken before I could get through these arrangements.
Question. By whose order was that battery moved ?
Answer. I have heard since that it was by order of General McDowell, but I do not know from my own knowledge. I went forward with the 5th and 11th Massachusetts, and did my best to get the battery back, and did get it back, either two or three times, I do not remember which. But every time when the time came to draw off the guns, the men could not be brought up to the scratch. They would come forward with their guns loaded and deliver their volley very well, and would then, instead of taking hold of the guns and drawing them off, fall back to a secure place and load. We must have remained in this positfon, Partii 3
84 CTOTIM0KY.
with these two regiments going up, delivering their fire and falling bade, until about three o'clock in the afternoon. At that time a large force of the rebels appeared in the woods on our right, when die men fled, and could not be brought up by any means I could use. And those two regiments were not collected again during the day. The Minnesota regiment was the only other regiment of my brigade. They did good work at the same point where these other regi- ments were, and did not break during the day : they went off the field in good order. The battery was taken, and that accounts for the whole of my brigade, as the 4th Pennsylvania left early in the morning.
Question. Had there been no delay, and had the battle commenced early in the morning, as was intended, what, in your opinion, would have been the re- sult of that battle t
Answer. I think the result would probably have been different, as far as I can judge now. I think we would have whipped them if we had begun the fight early in the morning.
Question. If the reserves had been brought up at any time, say from 12 to 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and brought into the fight, what, in your opinion, would then have been the result ?
Answer. My opinion after 2 o'clock was that nothing could save the day, I did not care how many troops came up.
Question. Your knowledge of the battle is confined to the action of your own brigade ?
Answer. Entirely to the action of my own brigade.
Question. Had your provisions been at GentreviUe when you reached there, and had you marched on Friday morning forward to Bull Bun before the arri- val of Johnson's reserves, and those from Richmond, what, in your opinion, would then have been the result 1
Answer. The result would have been in our favor. But mind, I do not know when those reserves of Johnson's and Smith's came up, and the reserves from Richmond. I do not know whether they were not there on Thursday.
Question. Did you, or did you not, hear the whistles of the locomotives and the running of the cars 1
Answer. I remember hearing the whistles all one night, and took it for granted that re-enforcements were being brought in.
Question. When was that?
Answer. On Friday night
Question. You therefore inferred that reserves were brought there on Friday night ? '
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And it is your opinion that, had the battle been delivered before those reserves came up, the result would have been different ?
Answer. Yes, sirl
By the chairman :
Question. On the Saturday before that battle was it known to officers that Johnson would probably be down there to join Beauregard ?
Answer. No, sir ; it was not, although, from hearing the whistles, we presumed he had come.
Question. You presumed that he had come %
Answer. Yes, sir ; but we had no positive information that he had.
Question. I have always wondered that %the battle was fought there when H was, after it was understood in the army that Johnson had come down, contrary to the expectation which was entertained that Patterson would hold him in check.
Answer. I will tell you what suggested itself to me when I got to Bull Bun, aad that is that we ought to have encamped on the fine hills were and waited
TESTIMONY. 85
there over night, and then got np early the next morning, when we would have whipped them.
The chairman: It has always seemed to me that when yon knew that John- son had come down yon should have got 25,000 men from here, and as many more, perhaps, from Fortress Monroe, and then you would have had the thing sure. I have always wondered why that was not done when Patterson had not held Johnson in check, as it was understood he would do.
The witness : Patterson's officers give a very good account of him. He knew nothing about what the army was to do. He supposed the battle had come off on Tuesday, and knew nothing about what was really doing.
The chairman : It strikes me that it was a great fault that -so important a circumstance was not understood before the battle was begun.
The witness : I think if we had stopped there at Sudley *s Stream they would have fought us that morning, but we would have fought them on our own ground, and would have whipped them.
The chairman: They would then have lost the benefit of all their batteries? I have always wondered at your going into that fight then, when you should really have got re-enforcements of 20,000 to 30,000 more men.
The witness : I think it would have been an advisable plan to have stopped there at Bull Bun. We would probably .have had to fight about the same time, but then we should have fought on our own ground, and should have had a better position than they could have got. We could have had a beautiful posi- tion there.
Question. They would have had no batteries to protect them ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. I suppose if Patterson had come down and turned their rear about the same time they attacked you, you would have succeeded beyond a doubt?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Chandler: Question. Five thousand men making an attack in their rear at any time, I suppose, would have settled the battle ? Answer. Yes, sir.
By the chairman :
Question. Could not some of our men have been sent around to tear up the railroad?
Answer. No, sir ; we were making for the railroad as fast as we could. That was our object. But they stopped us, and whipped us.
Question. You were too far to the left, were you not ?
Answer. I think we should have gone further to the right
Washington, D. C, December 26, 1861. General Irvin McDowell sworn and examined. By Mr. Chandler:
Question. We were instructed to make some inquiry in regard to the battle +f last July. In the first place, wag that battle of Bull Bun decided upon in a aooncil of war?
Answer. No, sir. I will give von in a few words the way that was done. There is much that precedes the hattle that would be interesting to you gentlemen to taow. Not to be too long, I will say that the general-in-chief, General Scott, falM upon me verbally to submit a plan of operations to go against Manassas*
86 TESTIMONY.
and to estimate the force necessary to carry out that plan. I cannot tell die day when this was done. I conld give you a copy of the plan I submitted, but unfortunately the copy I kept has not, I think, the date to it. The one I sent to him has, I think. I sent the plan to General Scott, and he read it and approved of it I was then summoned before the cabinet. There were some general officers there : General Sandford, General Tyler, General Mansfield, and General Meigs were there. I think those were all but I am not certain. I was than called upon to read my plan of operations, and I read it. No persons had any suggestions to make in reference to it except General Mansfield. He made some remarks, but said he had not thought about the matter, and did not know any- thing about it, and was not prepared to say anything in relation to it. As the plan was all approved of, without any alteration, and, I think, without any sug- gestion, except a slight one from General Mansfield, I then called the engineers to assist me, and gave the paper to them to discuss. They discussed it, and made no alterations, and had no suggestions to make except one. Captain Woodbury, now Major Woodbury, suggested that I should go by the right instead of by the left. I told him the reasons why I preferred to go by the left; that to go by the left was a conclusive movement, and to go by the right might not be.
Question. That is, to cut off the railroad?
Answer. Yes, sir. It was to go down by our left on their right and cut the railroad there. Your first question was as to whether there was any council of war on the plan. In reply, I said the plan was one that I ' submitted in compliance with verbal instructions from General Scott, and which plan' received no modification either from the cabinet or from General Scott, except a mere verbal correction, changing "communications" to "communication." Nor did any of the engineers make any suggestion, except the one I have men- tioned, to go by the right instead of the left. I told nim why I did not want to go in that direction, but said I was the last man in the world pledged .to my own views, and if any one could tell me anything better than I could myself, I would accept it, and give him the full credit of it. Now, in regard to my plan, I had, in the first place, to assume what the enemy had in front of me. I next assumed that there would be no secret of my pre- paring to go against them. ' They would know it, and as a consequence of that they would bring up whatever disposable force they had. Therefore, it was not so much what they had here, but what they would bring here, that I was to go against. I assumed that if General Butler would keep them engaged below, and General Patterson would keep Johnson engaged above, I would then have so much to go against. To do that I asked for a certain force. They agreed to it, -and gave me the force, but very late in the day. But they did not fulfil the condition with me so far as General Johnson was concerned. I had a part to play in the matter. It was but a part in a whole; it was a large part, still only a part. I had no control over the whole ; that was controlled by General Scott. On several occasions I mentioned to the general that I felt tender on the subject of General Patterson and General Johnson. In reply to some sug- gestion once made about bringing Patterson over to Leesburg, I said if he went there Johnson might escape and join Beauregard, and I was not in a condition to meet all their forces combined. I said that I went over there with every- thing green. That was admitted; but they said that the other side was equally green. I said that the chances of accident were much more with green troops than with veterans, and I could not undertake to meet all their forces together. General Scott assured me — I use his own words — "if Johnson joins Beauregard he shall have Patterson on his heels." He gave me this assurance, that mere should be no question in regard to keeping Johnson's troops engaged in the valley of Virginia. I estimated to go from Vienna with the largest force, and get in behind Fairfax Court-House ; go with one force down the Little Biver
TESTIMONY, 37
turnpike upon Fairfax Court-House ; go. with one force by way of Anandale, and then go off to the south by the old Braddock road, as it is called, and then hare the fourth column go south of the railroad. The railroad was then blocked sp and obstructed. They had broken down the bridges and torn up the track wnere they could, filled in the deep cuts with earth and trees, and obstructed the road as effectually as they could. I could not at first use that railroad, though I threw the largest part of the force called reserve upon the railroad to make the communications good. The largestpart of the 30,000 men were in front. I moved down Tuesday evening. When General Scott was called upon, or when the question was asked in the cabinet, when he would be ready to cany out this plan, General Scott fixed for me that day week. Up to that time General Scott never wished anything done on the other side of the river further than to merely fortify Arlington Heights. General Scott was exceed- ingly displeased that I should go over there. He had other plans in view, and personal plans, so far as I was concerned. And he was piqued and irritated that I was sent over there, and the more so that General Sandford was here in somewhat an equivocal position. He was here for three months, a major gen era! of troops in New York. General Scott did not wish to give him the command here in Washington; at least I infer so because he did not put him in command, and he put him in command on the other side of the river. Bat General Scott was told that he must put either General Mansfield or myself over there. He wished to keep General Mansfield here, and he put me over there. The general had opposed my somewhat rapid promotion, because he* ' thought it was doing a hurt to General Mansfield, ana when I was promoted he insisted that General Mansfield should also be promoted, and date back a week before my own promotion. When I was ordered to the other side General Scott sent me two messages by his aide-de-camp and military secretary, to make a personal request of the Secretary of War not to be sent on the other side. I said I could not do that. Just appointed a general officer, it was not for me to make a personal request not to take the command' which I had been ordered upon. I could not stand upon it. I had no reputation, as he had, and I refused to make any such application. So I went on the other side, and the general was cool for a great while. He did not like that I did not comply with his suggestion and ask not to be sent there. I was on the other side a long while without anything. No additions were made to the force at all. With difficulty could I get any officers. I had begged of the Secretary of War and the Secre- tary of the Treasury, who at that time was connected with the Secretary of War in many of the plans and organizations going forward, that I should not be obliged to organize and discipline and march and fight all at the same time. I sail that it was too much for any person to do. But they could not help it, or did not help it, and the thing went on until this project was broached. General Scott at the same time took occasion to say to the cabinet that he was never in favor of going over into Virginia. He did not believe in a little war by piecemeal. But he believed in a war of large bodies. He was in favor of moving down the Mississippi river with 80,000 men, of which I was to command the advance. We were to go down, fight all the battles that were necessary, take all the positions we could find, and garrison them, fight a battle at New Orleans and win it, and thus end the war. I did not think well of that plan, and was obliged to speak against it in the cabinet I felt that it was beyond everything a hazardous thing for our paper steamboats, as you might term them, to try to go down the river on such an expedition. They have some consider- able difficulty to get down safely in the most peaceable times and with all the precautions possible, and it would be exceedingly hazardous for them to under- take to go down there with a large army, with all their machinery above water sad exposed, and obliged to attack works opposed to them all the way down. Here is the ease of the Potomac now blockaded ; we do not venture to land and
38 TE8TIM0Ht.
attack the batteries here, though this is a wide river with a broad channel, one well known and which does not change. We attempt nothing of the sort here, and yet we were expected to go down the Mississippi a thousand miles, supply our force all the way down, attack the batteries, and be diminishing our force all the while by leaving garrisons in all the places we should deem of sufficient importance to retain. I thought the plan was full of most serious and vital objections. I would rather go to New Orleans the way that Packenham attempted to go there. I went over the river, as I have told you. General Mansfield felt hurt, I have no doubt, in seeing the command he had divided in two and a portion sent over there. I got everything with great diffi- culty. Some of my regiments came over verv late; some of them not till the very day I was to move the army. I had difficulty in getting transportation. In fact, I started out with no baggage train, with nothing at all for the tents, simply transportation for the sick and wounded and the munitions. The sup-
Slies were to go on afterwards. I expected the men to carry supplies for three ays in their haversacks. If I went to General Mansfield for troops, he said : . " I have no transportation." I went to General Meigs and he said he had trans- portation, but General Mansfield did not want any to be given until the troops should move. I said : " I agree to that, but between you two I get nothing." The quartermaster begged of me not to move, because he was not ready. I said : "We must move on Tuesday;" which was one week after the time General Scott had fixed. All my force had not come over by the time he fixed. A large part came over on Sunday, and some on the very Tuesday I moved. I told the general I was not ready to go. Said I to him : " So far as transporta- tion is concerned, 1 must look to you behind me to send it forward." 1 had no opportunity to test my machinery; to move it around and see whether it would work smoothly or not. In fact, such was the feeling, that when I had one body of eight regiments of troops reviewed together, the general censured me for it, as if I was trying to make some show. I did not think so. There was not a man there who had ever manoeuvred troops in large bodies. There was not one in the army; I did not believe there was one in the whole country; at least, I knew there was no one thene who had ever handled 30,000 troops. I had seen them handled abroad in reviews and marches, but I had never handled that number, and no one here had. I wanted very much a little time; all of us wanted it. We did not have a bit of it. The answer was : " You are green, it is true; but they are green, also; you are all green alike." We went on in that way. But there is one thing clear beyond any doubt. If the movements which had been ordered had been carried out, we should have had no difficulty at all. My plan was simply this : It was to move out this force upon these four lines. I haa to move them on four lines that had no communication with each other from the very nature of the country. But I thought I made each column strong enough to hold its own. If it could not penetrate it could stand still, and if attacked it could hold its own, while the other columns were pressing forward and trying to get behind the enemy. The roads from Alexandria radi- ate. One goes out to Vienna, one goes to Fairfax Court-House, one to Fairfax Station, and one further south to Pohick church. My orders were, that those on the right should go the first day — Tuesday — out to Vienna. I had taken . the precaution before to send General Richardson, who commanded a brigade I had organized at Chain Bridge, out to examine the road he afterwards moved over. Generals Keyes, Schenck, Richardson, and Sherman, in all four brigades, were to be at Vienna that night General Hunter, who commanded what I intended to be a sort of reserve, composed of General Bumside's command and General Porter's command, were to go on the Little River turnpike to AnaH- dale. General Miles was to go to Anandale a little before and turn down on the Braddock road. General Heintzelman was to go out also from Alexandria on the railroad, and send up some force to Vienna to hold that point after our troops
TBOTTMOTY 39
left it The next moraine General Tyler was to march from Vienna and go down upon the road towards Fairfax Court-House. General Hunter was to go forward to Fair&x Court-House direct. General Miles was to come down on the Braddock road to another road that crossed it, going from Fairfax Court-House to Fairfax Station, while Heintselman went down below. They were to be there early in the morning, I think at 8 o'clock. At Fairfax Court-House was the South Carolina brigade. And I do not suppose anything would have had a greater cheering effect upon the troops, and perhaps upon the country, than the capture of that brigade. And if General Tyler could have get down there any time in the forenoon instead of in the afternoon the capture of that brigade was beyond ques- tion. It was but 5,000 or 6,000 men, and Tyler had 12,000, at the same time that we were pressing on in front. He did not get down there until in the afternoon ; none of. us got forward in time. That was due to two things, per- haps,. The affair of Big Bethel and Vienna had created a great outcry against rushing into places that people did not know anything about. I think the idea of everyone was that we were to go into no such things as that ; that we were to feel our way. That, perhaps, caused the march to be very slow; because, from Vienna across the march was not more than five or six miles, and if they started by 4 o'clock in the morning they should get there by 8 o'cloek. They did not get there until 3 o'clock, and the South Carolina brigade marched at 11 o'clock, so that it slipped through our hands. Then, too, the men were not used to marching ; they stopped every moment to pick blackberries or to get water. They would not keep in the ranks,- order as much as you pleased. When they came where water was fresh they would pour the old water out of their canteens and fill them with fresh water ; they were not used to denying them- selves mueh. They were not used to journeys on foot ; the men of the north no more than the men of the south were used to going on foot much. While the men of the south were accustomed to riding horseback, those of the north rode in wagons for the shortest journeys, and they were pretty well broken down with this short march ; therefore, when I wanted them to push on to Centreville, they were so broken down that they could not get more than half way there. The subsistence was to come on the next morning. Thursday morning I went off to see about making this march off to the left. That day General Tyler got involved at Blackburn's Ford, which made it necessary to move the whole of the troops forward that day, instead of keeping them behind to draw their rations. The attack at Blackburn's Ford had a bad effect upon our men. They were all in high spirits before that, but had not succeeded in their first attack. That attack made all wish to know what we were going to dp, and where we were going to go, so that the next two days were employed by General Barnard and those under him in trying to discover where we could penetrate this line. They went out and were unsuccessful. They went oat again at night, and were again unsuccessful. On Saturday about noon they reported that they had found a place. I at once gave orders to march at 6 o'clock that night, going part of the distance and stopping, and then move on early in the morning ; but General Burnside, who was the furthest off, said that it would be much less fatiguing for his men to make one march instead of two, and that if we started early enough in the morning we could reach there in time. I yielded to it at once, as it was only on account of the men that I wasted to stop. I started in the morning. We got around late, it is true ; there were delays about getting into the road. General Tyler was late, and General Hunter was slow in getting around ; still, we substantially carried out the plan. We got over there and met the enemy ; and there I found that, in addition to Gftoesal Beauregard, I had General Johnston-— how much of him I did not know. I learned afterwards that some 7,000 or 8,000, the bulk of his force, had arrived. St31> we were successful against both until about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when the remainder of his force eame upon us upon our right when our men were tired and exhausted, and that caused tne day to turn against us.
40 TB0TEKOHT*
I have learned since, in relation to that movement of General Johnston, which was the fatal thing in the whole of this battle, and which General Scott assured me should not take place, or if it did General Patterson should be driving him in, that General Patterson was before General Johnston on Wednesday, and on Thursday morning, at 4 o'clock, he ordered his troops to march* I learned from General Morell — now in General Fitz-John Porter's division, but who was then on the staff of General Sandford, who commanded under General Patterson— that they all expected that they were going right down to Winchester on Thurs- day, and that all the men were in the highest possible spirits at the idea of going there,and that General Sandford believed they were superior to Johnston's force* But instead of going down to Winchester, after they got down to a place called Bunker Hill, they turned off to the left and went off towards Harper's Ferry. Then the men became so dissatisfied that they demanded their discharge. Up to that time there had been no indications of turbulence. General Johnston, om on that same day — Thursday— when he found out that Patterson had gone away, left in the afternoon between 2 and 3 o'clock, and pushed down in a mas- terly manner as hard as he could to join Beauregard. General Patterson in the meantime was, I am told, under the greatest possible alarm, and telegraphed all the time, and sent an officer down, who arrived on Sunday, to General Scott for re-enforcements against General Johnston, General Johnston at that very time being before me here ; and General Scott was so impressed with this, that a large part of the force in Washington was ordered to go up there to join General Patterson. So completely was General Patterson outwitted that he thought General Johnston had 40,000 men there. One who was on his staff, and his ad- jutant general, told me that they had got records, reports, and returns to the effect that Johnston had something like 40,000 men. All I can say is, that if he had 40,000 men, I had the whole of them on me.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Do you believe he had 10,000?
Answer. I think he had from 12,000 to 15,000, and General Patterson had in the vicinity of 20,000. If he had 40,000, then I had them all. But I as- sume that he joined Beauregard in the first place with 8,000, and that his last re-enforcement was about 4,000.
By the chairman :
Question. When did you first learn that Johnston was released from Patter- son and down here ?
Answer. I first learned it in a way beyond all doubt on the field of battle. About 11 o'clock in the day I made some prisoners.
Question. Did no one teU you before ?
Answer. A man came to me before. But, great God! I heard every rumor in the world, and I put them all aside unless a man spoke of his own personal knowledge. Some person came to me; I did not know who he was. I had people coming to me all the time, each one with something different. All that I paid no attention to. This person came to me and said, I think, " The news is that Johnston has joined Beauregard." He might have said that somebody eke had joined Beauregard. He did not know it himself; had heard it from others. Some one said : " We heard the cars coming in last night" Well, I expected that I expected they would bring into Manassas every available man they could find. All I did expect was that General Butler wovU keep them engaged at Fortress Monroe, and Patterson would keep diem engaged in the valley of Virginia. That was the condition they accepted from me to go out and do this work. I hold that I more than fulfilled my part of the compact, because I was victorious against Beauregard and 8,000 of Johnston's troops also. Up to 3 o'clock in die afternoon I had done all and more than all that I
TJCHTJMOHY. 41
had promised or agreed to do ; and it was this last straw that broke the camel's baek— if 70a can call 4,000 men a straw, who came upon me from behind fresh from the cars.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Has it not been a fact, all through this war, that our generals in front of the enemy — as was General Patterson in front of General Johnston— have been deceived as to the force of the enemy f General Patterson says that • he had positive information that General Johnston had over 35,000 men, while he had only 20,000. Has this not been a bragging, lying force that they have been exhibiting along our lines all the timet
Answer. There is one thing : In war the object is to deceive the enemy as to your force and make him believe that you are stronger than you really are. I have taken the evidence of negro men and found it very good myself. But that is a matter of judgment ; you may get yourself overreached.
Washington, January 23, 1862. General Irvin McDowell recalled and examined. By Mr. Chandler :
Question. There are one or two points in relation to the battle of Bull Bun upon which the committee desire you to make some further explanation. You state in your official report, under date of August 4, 1861, that there was delay in the first division in getting on the road on die morning of the battle, and that this was a great misfortune. Will you please state more fully in relation to that delay ?
Answer. In my general order, No. 22f of July 20, 1861, providing for the move- ment of die several divisions to attack the enemy, it was arranged that General Tyler's division should move at half past two a. m., precisely, on the Warrenton turnpike to threaten the possession of the bridge. General Tyler's division con- sisted of four brigades, three only of which moved at this time, as directed in the order referred to. Schenck's and Sherman's brigades were one mile from Gentre- vilie on the road from Gentreville to the Stone Bridge— on the right and left of the road ; Keyes's brigade was about a half a mile to the east of Gentreville, on the right of the same road going west ; the second division— Hunter's-— was about two miles from Centreville, and to the east of it. This division was ordered to move at two o'clock a. m. precisely. Heintselman's division was two miles distant from Centreville, and east of it, on what is called the old Braddock road. This division was to move at halfpast two a. m. precisely. Heintzelman's division consisted of the brigades of Wilcox, Franklin, and Howard. Hunter's division consisted of the brigades of Burnside and General Andrew Porter. All these divisions had the road in common, from the encampment of Sherman's and Schenek's brigades to the point where the road to Sualey 's Springs turned off to to the right— at a blacksmith's shop — a little over a mile. Tyler was to move at half past two a. m* and Hunter was to move half an hour earlier, so that he might close up on Tyler's division. Heintzelman was to move at half past two a. m., so as to mil in the rear of Hunter's division. Tyler was expected to get over the ground, between the encampment of his advanced brigade and where the road turned off to the right at the blacksmith shop, in time to oner no oh* •tractions to the road* which was to be used in common by all the divisions. I was sick during the night and morning, and did not leave my headquarters— a little over a mile, perhaps a mile and a quarter, east of Gentreville— until I thmghtall the divisions were fully in motion, so as to give myself as much rest
42 TESTIMONY.
as possible. When I had got beyond Oentreville about a mile, I passed the troops lying down and sitting down on the wayBide. Upon asking why they did not move forward, the reply came to me that the road was blocked np. I saw some men coming from the left of the road through a cornfield into the road. When I asked to what regiment they belonged, they said the 2d New York, which formed a part of Bchenck's brigade. I went forward, urging the troops to move on, until I got to the blacksmith's shop, where the road turned off to Sudley's Springs. I was making every effort, personally and by my aides, to have the road cleared, in order that Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions might take up their march to the right by way of Sudley's Springs, to carry out the plan of battle.
ByMr.Odell:
Question. Whose division blocked up the road ?
Answer. The first division, General Tyler's division. Major, now General, Barnard, who was the chief of engineers on my staff, in his report to me, dated July 29, 1861, says as follows : " You are aware of the unexpected delay. The two leading brigades of Tyler's did not clear the road for. Hunter to this point (blacksmith shop, where the road turned to the right) until half past five." That was three hours after the time fixed to start.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. What was the distance from the encampment of Tyler's leading brigades to the blacksmith shop t
Answer. About a mile. I directed one of my staff to notice when General Tyler commenced firing. It was six o'clock. Colonel, now General Heintzel- man, in his report to me of July 31, states as follows :
"At Centreville we found the road filled with the troops, and were detained three hours to allow the divisions of Generals Tyler and Hunter to pass. I followed them with my division immediately in rear of the latter."
I will mention that General Tyler in moving forward as the troops were then moving forward — gome 18,000 men — was so supported that it was felt that he might move with confidence and promptness upon the road. I have been thus particular in making this explanation because General Tyler has written me a letter, complaining that my report does him injustice, and asking me to set him right in reference to this matter of delay. Under the circumstances I did not feel that I could make any change. He also stated that he received no orders from me during the day.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. I notice in your report that you state that you sent an aide-de-camp to General Tyler to direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front of him to attack the division which had crossed over. Will you state what this order was, and by whom it was sent %
Answer. I sent an order to General Tyler to press forward the attack from a
S)int near where this road that turns off at the blacksmith shop crosses Bull un, near Sudley's Springs. I sent Lieutenant Kingsbury, my aide-de-camp, to General Tyler to press forward his attack, because I saw columns of duBt, indicating large bodies of troops, moving up in front of General Tyler's division, and as but a small part of Hunter's division had, at that time, crossed Bull Run, I was afraid he would be crushed before we could get a sufficient body of troops forward to support him. Lieutenant Kingsbury reported to me that he had gone to General Tyler, and found General Tyler, with his aide-de-camp, near * a tree, in the branches of which he had some* men observing the troops of the enemy coming up on the opposite side. lieutenant Kingsbury reported to me that he had told General Tyler it was my order he should press forward his
TESTIMONY. 48
attack, and General Tyler replied, " What does he mean ? Does he mean that I shall cross the stream ?" Lieutenant Kingsbury said : " I give you the mes- sage exactly as it was given to me ;" to which General Tyler returned answer, "I have a great mind to send some" regiment, or brigade, or something, "across the stream " Lieutenant Kingsbury made me a written report of this, which is mislaid. And while I was waiting at the blacksmith shop to see which direc- tion the battle was to take I also sent an order to General Tyler by my then aide-de-camp, Miyor Wadsworth, now General Wadsworth.
• By Mr. Gooch :
Question. When was Keyes's brigade ordered to move ?
Answer. General Tyler states, in his report, that it was ordered to move at two o'clock in the morning. I did not give any orders to General Keyes, but > to Tyler. General Tyler was ordered to move at 2 J a. m. He must have given the order to bring up his rear brigade at two o'clock. General Keyes says : " In compliance with the orders of Brigadier General Tyler, I have the honor to rer port my operations, leaving my camp at Oentreville at two o'clock a. m."
Question. You were aware, when you gave the order to General Tyler, that Keyes's brigade was encamped at Oentreville?
Answer, i es, sir.
Question. Was there anything between Keyes's brigade and the remainder of General Tyler's division?
Answer. Nothing. * Question. Was there anything to prevent Keyes's brigade from moving up and joining the rest of the division?
Answer. There ought to have been nothing. There was, because I believe Hunter's division got into the road before him.
Question. Then if he was interrupted or obstructed in moving up and join- ing the remainder of Tyler's division, whose fault was it?
Answer. It must either have been his fault in getting off so late, if he was ordered to move at 2 o'clock by General Tyler, or the fault of some of Hunter's division in going too soon.
Question. The intention was that the whole of General Tyler's division should move from the point where Sherman and Schenck were encamped, and on the Warrenton turnpike, at 2 J o'clock?
Answer. Yes, sir. This brigade of Keyes's had, in consequence of previous movements, become dislocated from the other two, but that, practically, had no effect upon the march of Sunday morning. What I wished to do was to post this force of Tyler's at or near the Stone Bridge, and under the cover of his force make this flank movement to the right.
Question. Can you state whether or not Schenck's and Sherman's brigades had moved forward past the. point where the road turns off at the blacksmith shop in time to give the road to the other divisions as they came up ?
Answer. They had not; that is just the point.
Question. Then the other divisions of the army were held back, not only by Keyes's brigade, but by the other brigades of Tyler's division?
Answer. Keyes did not hold them back; he went into the field and they came up.
Question. Then they were held back by Schenck's and Sherman's brigades?
Answer. Yes, sir; by the slow movement of that part of the force.
Question. *It has been said that General Tyler ordered Keyes's brigade up to join him prior to the day of the battle, and that order was countermanded by you, and the brigade remained back where it was.
Answer. That may have been, but it is a matter of no sort of consequence whatever. I do not know whether that was so or not But it was of no con-
44 TESTIMONY.
sequence, because General Tyler and the whole of his forces were ahead; the others were behind.
Question. Would there have been any advantage in stationing the several divisions differently; that is, having some divisions which had farther to march stationed where Tyler's was?
Answer. No, sir; Tyler got his position there logically from the way the force marched to Centreville. Tyler was to throw himself between Fairfax Court-House and Gentreville. Hunter started from Anandale, and behind Tyler; Miles was below, and Heintzelman farther below still. When Tyler moved forward to Centreville and commenced the fight at Blackburn's Ford the other divisions were behind. Now to have chanted them around would simply have made an unnecessary .inversion; there would have been no particular object in it I should have ordered forward first whichever division might have occu- pied Tyler's position, so that, under cover of that, I might have made my flank movement to the right with the other divisions.
Question. It was desirable, then, that a force should be at Stone Bridge be- fore any force passed up toward Sudley's Springs ?
Answer. I think so. I wanted a strength there, and then, under cover of that, I could move my other divisions up. Had that not been done, there was danger that the other divisions going up to Sudley's church, having die long- est distance to go, might be attacked ana cut off.
Question. It was necessary that that division of the army which was to move to Stone Bridge should have the road, and reach and pass the point where the blacksmith shop stands, before the remaining portion of the army should turn off towards Sualey's Springs ?
Answer. That was part of my well determined plan. I thought that was the better way. I do not think any other would have been a safe movement.
Question. I wish to ask you whether the force you left at Gentreville was regarded bv you as a reserve, or whether they were stationed as they were posted at the different points that day because it was necessary to have troops there to protect the rear of your army t
Answer. More the latter than the former, though partly both; to act as a reserve and, at the same time, to guard against an attack on our left or right. I remained at the turn-off by the blacksmith shop for nearly an hour, in doubt whether there would be an attack above at all. I was inclined to look for it at the left. And I have learned since that General Beauregard intended to attack me at eight o'clock, at Blackburn's Ford ; and when General Tyler commenced firing at Stone Bridge and received no response, I was in doubt. In my order for the battle I sav : " The enemy has planted a battery on the Warrenton turnpike to defend the approach to Bull Run, has mined the Stone Bridge," &c. I wanted to commence the attack on that point, which I was afraid I could not turn, and under cover of that attack to throw a large force up to the right. We expected the Stone Bridge to be a strong point, with batteries in position, regular works, &c. We expected the bridge would be blown up so that we could not use it, and I had made preparations so that the engineer should have another bridge to be used there. We were to make our move to the right and attack them under cover of this attack at the bridge.
Question. If it had not been for the disposition of the forces of Miles's divi- sion which you made on the day of the battle, would not your whole army have been exposed and liable to be cut off?
Answer. Yes, sir ; by a movement of the enemy on my left.
Question. That is, by a movement from the enemy's right on your left?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I can show you how I felt on that subject by referring you to my general order No. 22, in which I say : " The fifth division (Miles's) will take position at the Gentreville Heights ; Richardson's brigade will, for the time, become part of his (Miles's) division, and will continue in its present
TESTIMONY, 45
position- One brigade will be in the viBaee, and one near the present station of Richardson's brigade. This division will threaten Blackburn's Ford, and remain in reserve at Centreville. The commander will open fire with artillery only, and will bear in mind that it is a demonstration only that he is to make. He will cause such defensive works, abattis, earthworks, &c, to be thrown up as will strengthen his position. Lieutenant Prime, of the engineers, will be charged with this duty." I will also further, in relation to this same matter, rive an extract from my report : " I had also felt anxious about the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, along the ridge, fearing that while we should be in force to the front, endeavoring to turn the enemy's posi- . tkm, we ourselves should be turned by him by this road ; for if he should once obtain possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west to the foot of the spurs of the Blue Ridge, we should have been irretrievably cut off and destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in force, and sent an engineer to extemporise some field-works to strengthen their position.'9
Question. And you say now that you understand it was the intention of Beauregard to attack you at that point ?
Answer. I have understood since that General Beauregard intended in the first place to attack me at 8 o'clock on the morning of the battle, and to attack me on my left, at this Blackburn's Ford* or in its vicinity ; and I have also understood that during the battle he did order a heavy attack to be made in that direction. An attack was made there, but not in the force he intended. It failed on account of an order which he gave one of the commanders having miscarried.
Question. Would it, in your opinion, have been judicious, at any time prior to the rout of our army, to have ordered the force, or any portion of it, sta- tioned at Centreville on to the field of action %
Answer. I do not think it would have been judicious to have sent them one moment earlier than they were sent for. A reference to the reports of Colonel Davie8, Colonel Richardson, and Hunt, of the artillery, I think, will show this. They were there having a heavy attack on the left, which would have been heavier but for the failure I have referred to. General Barnard, in his report of July 29, says :
" It will be seen from the above that the combination, though thwarted by different circumstances, was actually successful in uniting three entire brigades, (excepting the brigade of Schenck, which had just opened its way to fall on the enemy's right at the moment when our lines finally gave way in front,) upon the decisive point.
" A fault, perhaps, it was that it did not provide earlier for bringing the two brigades of Miles (in reserve at Centreville) into action. One of his brigades (Richardson's) actually did participate, though not on the battle-field ; and in its affair on Blackburn's Ford probably did neutralize the attack of the enemy."
General Barnard did not then know the extent of that afiair on the left. He thought that only Richardson was engaged in it. A reference to the reports of Colonel Davies, commanding a brigade under Colonel Miles, Colonel Hunt, commanding a battery of artillery, and of Colonel Miles, will show why only one brigade from Centreville was sent forward to the front And it will show that the affair on the left was a matter of much greater importance than Gen- eral Barnard seems at that time to have supposed it to be. Davies's brigade was actually engaged, as was also that of Richardson, in repelling the attack of the enemy on the left. Colonel Miles, in his report, says that he received an order to put two brigades on the Warrenton turnpike at the bridge, and a staff officer was sent to order forward Davies's brigade ; that whilst this staff officer was executing his instructions, Davies sent word that he wanted the re- serve forward where he was, as he was. attacked by 3,000 of the enemy; that
46 TESTIMONY.
the staff officer, therefore, properly suspended the giving of the order, and re- ported immediately to Colonel Miles, and this caused him to advance with only one brigade, Blenker's, to the position on the Warrenton turnpike.
Question. The shortest road from Manassas to Centreville was by Black* burn's Ford?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. When the retreat of our army took place, had the way by Black- burn's Ford not have been obstructed by the force you had placed there or near there, could not the enemy have moved forward immediately upon Centreville and cut off the retreat of your whole army?
Answer. Yes, sir; and I refer again to my report in answer to that question.
"At the time of pur retreat, seeing great activity in this direction, (Black- burn's Ford,) also firing and columns of dust, I became anxious for this place, fearing if it were turned or forced the whole stream *f our retreating mass would be captured or destroyed. After providing for the protection of the re- treat by Porter's or Blenker's brigade, I repaired to Richardson, and found the whole force ordered to be stationed for the holding of the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville on the march for Centreville under orders from the division commanders. I immediately halted it and ordered it to take up the best line of defence across the ridge that their position admitted of, and subsequently taking in person the command of this part of the army. I caused such disposition of the force as would best serve to check the enemy."
ByMr.Odell:
Question. Was the attack on Blackburn's Ford on Thursday, the 18th of July, made by your order?
Answer. No, sir, it was not. On July the 18th I was between Germantown and Centreville, General Tyler's division being between my then position and Centreville. I wrote him the following note, which was carried to him by General, then Colonel, Wadsworth, my aide-de-camp :
"Between Germantown and Centreville,
" My 18, 1861—8.15 a. m. " Brigadier General Tyler — General : I have information which leads me to believe you will find no force at Centreville, and will meet with no resistance in getting there. Observe well the roads to Bull Run and to Warrenton. Do not bring on any engagement, but keep up the impression that we are moving on Manassas. I go to Heintzelman to arrange about the plan we have talked over."
The plan was for the army to go around and attack the enemy's right I will give an extract from General Tyler's report of July 27 as bearing on this question:
Headquarters First Division Department NE. Virginia,
Washington City, July 27, 1861. "General McDowell, Commanding Department :
" Sir : On the 18th instant you ordered me to take my division, with die two 20-pounder rifled guns, and move against Centreville, to carry that position. My division moved from its encampment at 7 a, m. At 9 a. m. Richardson's brigade reached Centreville, and found that the enemy had retreated the night before ; one division on the Warrenton turnpike, in the direction of Gainesville, and the other, and by far the largest division, towards Blackburn's Ford, on Bull Run."
This order of mine that I have referred to was given to hint in person by
TSaXHfQgY. 47
then Major Wadsworth, who also cautioned him verbally from me not to do too much in the way of keeping up the impression that we were moving on Ma- nassas.
I will now read from General Barnard's report of. July 29. He was the chief of engineers on my staff:
" It should be borne in mind that the plan of campaign had been to turn the
Stiition and turn Manassas by the left ; that is to say, that from Fairfax Court- ouse and Oentreville we were to make a flank movement toward Songster's and Fairfax Station, and thence to Wolf Run Shoals, or in that direction.
" In my interview with the commanding general he said nothing to indicate any change of plan ; but, on the contrary, his remarks carried the impression that he was more than ever confirmed in his plan, and spoke of the advance on Oentreville as a ' demonstration.'
" In proposing therefore to reconnoitre the enemy's position at Blackburn's Ford, it was not with the slightest idea that this point would be attacked; but a reconnois8ance would be the carrying out of a * demonstration.' '
"Whilst I was awaiting Captain Alexander, Iencountered Matthew 0. Mitchell, who was secured as a guide. Representing himself as a Union man and a resident of that vicinity, I was engaged questioning him, when intelligence was received that General Tyler had sent back for artillery and infantry, and that the enemy was in sight before him. Riding to the front, I joined General Tyler and Colonel Richardson. Proceeding with them a short distance further, we emerged from the woods, and found ourselves at a point at which the road com- mences its descent to Blackburn's Ford. The run makes here a curve or bow towards us, which the road bisects. The slopes from us towards it were gentle and mostly open. On the other side the banks of the run rise more abruptly, and are wooded down to the very edge of the run. Higher up a clear spot could be seen here and there ; and still higher, higher than our own point of view, and only visible from its gently sloping towards us, an elevated plateau, comparatively open, in which Manassas Junction is situated.
" Although, owing to the thickness of the wood, little could be seen along the edge of the run, it was quite evident from such glimpses as we could obtain that the enemy was in force behind us. I represented to General Tyler that this point was the enemy's strong position, on the direct road to Manassas Junc- tion ; that it was no part of the plan to assail it. I did not, however, object to a " demonstration," believing that it would favor what I supposed still to be the commanding general's plan of campaign.
" The two 20-pounders, of Parrott's, had been ordered up. They were opened . upon the enemy's position, firing in various directions, without our being able to perceive the degree of effect they produced. They had fired perhaps a dozen rounds, when they were answered by a rapid discharge from a battery appa- rently close down to the run and at the crossing of the road. The 20-pounders continued their fire, directing at this battery, and Ayre's battery was brought up and stationed on the left. The enemy's batteries soon ceased answering. After ours had continued playing for about a half an hour, I felt it a useless ex- penditure of ammunition, and so stated to you, (Captain Fry, who arrived on the spot shortly before this,) and presumed General Tyler concurred in this opinion, as the firing soon ceased.
" I supposed this would be an end of the affair. But perceiving troops filing down towards the run, I thought it necessary to impress General Tyler with the fact that it was no part of the plan of the commanding general to bring on a serious engagement. I directed Captain Alexander (engineers) to state this . feet to him, which he did in writing, having stated the same verbally before."
My own order was not to bring on an engagement, and here was the chief of my engineers, and my adjutant general besides, urging the same thing on Gen- eral Tyler.
48 TESTIMONY.
Washington, D. C, December 20, 1861. General Jambs S. Wadsworth sworn and examined. By Mr. Chandler :
Question. You were an aid to General Mansfield at the battle of Bull Ron, were you not ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you consider the victory won from one to two o'clock in the afternoon of that day?
Answer. Yes, sir; and the reason we thought so was that we had driven the enemy from a large open battle-field some mile and a half back.
By the chairman :
Question. Suppose that Johnston had not come down, but had been kept back, what would have been the result?
Answer. Take out the whole of Johnston's command, and the victory would have been very easily won. But take out the portion of his command that came down under General Elger about three o'clock in the afternoon, and I still think the battle would have been won by us, but we could not say exactly. But we were holding our own, and had other troops to bring up. It is not cer- tain that we should have won the battle, but General McDowell thought we Bhould. I was where that re-enforcement arrived. I happened to be where the first discharge of musketry from that re-enforcement came in. It was very severe, and then they followed it up immediately with a very bold charge right on die field. They came through a piece of woods on to the battle-field. We had driven the enemy entirely out ot the battle-field, which covered an area of 400 or 500 acres, and they were in the woods offering a very sturdy resist- ance, and it is impossible to say that we should certainly have overcome that resistance. Their last re-enforcement came up on their extreme left, and on our extreme right, bo that they pretty nearly outflanked us. Their first discharge was upon some cavalry which had been withdrawn back to a point of compara- tive safetv, as they were not of much importance to us. That killed several of them, and then they retired immediately, or rather stampeded in a very disor- derly manner.
Question. At what time was it known among the officers that Patterson had failed to keep Johnston in check?
Answer. It was not known generally until the time o& the action. I did not know it. I think it had been a matter of conversation before. I think General McDowell the day before expressed some apprehensions that Patterson had not kept Johnston occupied. I understand that General Cameron, who was out there on Saturday, reported something which led them to believe that Johnston might be there. What the extent of that information was, however, I have no means of knowing.
Question. What is your opinion as to the result of that battle had the pro- visions and transportation been brought up on Thursday, and the battle fought on Friday morning, instead of Sunday?
Answer. On Friday morning it woulcbhave been with no portion of Johnston's command there. I think there would have been no battle at all then ; that we would have walked over the field. Johnston is regarded by our officers as much superior to Beauregard; as much the ablest officer in their army. All the reports show that he had a great deal to do with the disposition of the enemy on that day.
TESTIMONY. 49
Washington, December 30, 1861. Colonel Stephen G. Champlin sworn and examined.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Ton were in the fight at Blackburn's Ford on the Thursday before Bull Bun, were you not?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was your opinion in regard to the capture of that battery, if you had been supported?
Answer. I think with one brigade in addition to prevent them from out-flank- ing us we could have taken it.
Question. Without heavy loss ?
Answer. Yes, sir; we could have taken it at the point of the bayonet easy enough if we had had another brigade there. That was the way tp have taken it. * Question. Then would you have had a severe battle on Friday morning, do y6u think?
Answer. My opinion is that that was the key of the position at that time.
Question. Would that have ended the matter?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I think so. There would have been no battle at Stone Bridge, for we would have been in a position to have out-flanked them at Man- assas. Every body of troops they threw up to the Stone Bridge would have been too far on their left.
By Mr. Gooch.
Question. You think those batteries should have been taken before pressing further on?
Answer. I think so. If we attacked the batteries at all at Blackburn's Ford we should have taken them and held them, for that was their centre at that time. They never could then have fought the battle at Stone Bridge, for we oould have marched over the bridge and captured every man there. I think that on Thursday their forces in those batteries were light compared with what they were on Sunday. They saw there were demonstrations made at it, and they were apparently prepared to meet them.
ByMr.OdeU:.
Question. Were yom in the Bull Run fight*?
Answer. No, sir ; we remained at the hill overlooking Blackburn's Ford to hold those batteries. If we had not held them they would have crossed over there and cut General McDowell's army all to pieces.
Washington, D. C, December 28, 1861. General George W. Morell sworn and examined.
By Mr. Chandler: Question. You were on General Patterson's staff, were you not ? Answer. I was on General Sanford's staff, and with General Patterson a short time.
Question. You were with General Patterson from on or about the 16th to the 25th of July ?
Answer. Yes, sir; that is, during the march from Martinsburg towards Win- chester. * Partii i
50 TEOTDiomr.
Question. What was General Patterson's force at that time %
Answer. We estimated it at from 18,000 to 20,000 men.
Question. Mostly three months' men 1 *
Answer. They were all three months' men except a small portion of regulars — a very small portion. *
Question. General Johnston's force was at Winchester ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. General Patterson's force of from 18,000 to 20,000 men was at Hartinsburg ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Can you tell on what day of the month General Patterson's division advanced from Hartinsburg towards Winchester ?
Answer. Yes, sir; we left Martinsburg on the 15th of July, on Monday morning.
Question. Advancing towards Winchester 1
Answer. Yes*, sir ; we went that day to Bunker Hill, a little over half way. We remained there until the 16th of July.
Question. What day of the week was that ?
Answer. The 16th was Tuesday.
Question. That was within how many miles of Winchester ?
Answer. I think it was eight or ten miles.
Question. Proceed.
Answer. I think we left the next morning, the 17th, at 3 o'clock.
Question. What direction did you then take and where did you go ?
Answer. We first received orders in the evening to be ready to march in the morning, without the line of march being indicated to us. And just before we moved we received orders to go to Smithfield, or Midway, as it is called, which is on the main turnpike road from Harper's Ferry to Winchester.
Question. How far did you go %
Answer. We went to Smithfield ; and then, instead of going to Winchester, we made a retrograde movement to Charlestown. Then we knew we were going to Harper's Ferry.
Question. While you were at Smithfield you were threatening Winchester !
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And had you remained at Smithfield you still threatened Win- chester, and would have held Johnston in check by that threatening position ?
Answer. I think we should.
Question. But the moment you turned down towards Charlestown you ceased to threaten Winchester 1 •
Answer. Entirely so. T? hat developed the whole movement.
Question. That left Johnston to start off where he pleased %
Answer. Yes, sir ; and he did start that same day.
Question. Can you tell why that march towards Charlestown was made ?
Answer. No, sir; I cannot.
Question. This place of Bunker Hill, or this of Midway, was threatening Winchester 1
Answer. Yes, sir; within a few hours' march of Winchester.
Question. According to the best information you could get, what was the force of Johnston in front of you at Winchester at that time ?
Answer. I suppose he had a little over 20,000 men ; anywhere from 20,000 to 25,000.
Question. You suppose youf force was sufficient at any rate to hold him in check 1
Answer. I have no doubt of that. And even if we had fought him and been beaten he would have been in no condition to have come down here.
TESTIMONY. 51
Question. Bid the officers on the staff understand, when yon made that for- ward movement, that it was to threaten and hold Johnston in that position 1
Answer. He supposed we were going to fight him immediately/
Question. Was the spirit of the troops such as to lead yon to expect a favor- able result ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; though I saw but little of them, except our own division. Pour New York regiments went up under General Sanford to re-enforce General Patterson. I was then on General Sanford's staff. Two of those regiments, the 5th and 12th, were excellent regiments. The other two were volunteers, and one of them was an excellent regiment. The New York troops were in excellent spirits until after we made that retrograde movement towards Charles- town. They then got a little shaky and dissatisfied. •
By Mr. Odell.
Question. Did not General Sanford join these four regiments with four or six, other New York regiments there ?
Answer. He had more than four regiments there. I think he had about 5,000 men. These four regiments I speak of went up with him from here.
Question. Did not General Sanford then, with these four regiments, with another portion of New York troops, some who had been under him, but were then with Patterson, and which were assigned to General Sanford on his coming there?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I think so. There were some troops previously with Pat- tenon which were assigned to General Sanford's command.
Question. Are you cognizant of the fact that General Sanford offered to fight Johnston with these New York troops alone, if General Patterson would sup- port him ?
Answer. No, sir. General Sanford has made such a remark to me. I do not know that he made the offer to General Patterson. I do not know what occurred between General Sanford and General Patterson.
Question. My recollection is that General Sanford said to me that he offered to fight Johnston, in whatever force he might be, with the New York regiments he had, if Patterson would support him.
Answer. General Sanford was anxious to go forward, I know.
By Mr. Chandler. Question. You understood perfectly well when you turned off to CharlesUwn that you relieved Johnston's army 1 Answer. Yes, sir.
By the chairman. Question. Do you know that any reason was given for that movement ? Answer. No, sir. I never heard any explanation of it. We joined General Patterson on Wednesday morning, I think, and moved the following Monday.
By Mr. Chandler.
Question. Were you cognizant of the fact that General Patterson sent to the fWar Department for still further re-enforcements on or about the 20th or 21st of July, about the time of the battle of Bull Run ?
Answer. No, sir; I do not know anything of General Patterson's intercourse- with the department, or what his orders were.
Question. You were not absolutely upon his staff?
Answer. Not at all.
Question. You were upon General Sanford's staff?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. With the army under Patterson ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
52 TESTIMONY. .
By Mr. Johnson :
Question. Was it understood by the officers of the division there that this battle of Bull Run was to be fought on any particular day, or at any particular time?
Answer. We supposed it was to be fought about that time, but did not know any particular day for it. We knew that it was threatening, and supposed that General Patterson's movement upon Johnston would be at the same time, and # with the view of holding him in . check. And when we turned off towards Gharlestown I was under the impression, without knowing anything about it, that our object was attained, and that we had held him in check as long as it was necessary.
By the chairman :
Question. What prevented your destroying the railroad Johnston came down on ? Answer. It was below Winchester. We would have had first to have beaten him.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. If you bad beaten him, then you could have done it f Answer, Yes, sir ; we could then have come down on the very road he did. Even if we had fought him and been whipped, which I very much doubt, he could not have come down here. We would have given him such a fight that Be would not have been in a condition to have come down to Manassas.
ByMr.OdeU:
Question. When you arrived at Charlestown the soldiers were very much in- furiated against Patterson, were they not ?
Answer. Some of them expressed themselves very strongly against the movement. It did not grow into any difficulty that I am aware of.
Question. Did he not have to leave ?
Answer. O ! no, sir. Among some of the regiments — among those three New York regiments I spoke of, and some of the others — there was a strong feeling against him expressed ; but it did not rise to anything like difficulty. One of the regiments, the eleventh Indiana, under Colonel Wallace, tendered their ser- vices ten days after their time had expired, so I was told at Charlestown. The first troops that wanted to go home were Pennsylvania troops.
By Mr. Chandler :
Answer. But as long as you were going forward towards the enemy nobody wanted to go home ?
Answer. Not that I know of.
Question. All the dissatisfaction among the troops occurred after you turned back?
Answer. The first I heard was at Charlestown.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. What reason was given for turning down towards Charlestown ? Answer. I never heard of any. The commanding officer gives his orders, and never assigns any reasons.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. And when the order was given to march at three o'clock in. the morning you supposed you were to march on the enemy ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I supposed so. I know that on the day I was at Bunker Hill I was out with a large party, clearing out a side-road leading towards Winchester.
* TESTIMONY. 53
Washington, D. C, December 28, 1861. General Henry W. Slocum sworn and examined. By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Were you in the battle of Bull Bun?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. In what command ?
Answer. I had a regiment there.
Question. What regiment?
Answer. The 27th New York regiment.
Question. To which division of the army were you attached ?
Answer. To General Hunter's.
Question. Then you occupied the extreme right?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. The final attack made by Johnston's reserves was made upon your division, was it not?
Answer. Yes, sir; it was.
Question. Will you, very briefly, and as concisely as possible, describe the position of your force at that time, and for an hour and a half before the arrival of Johnston's reserves ?
Answer. I was wounded at two o'clock, and taken off the field, about the time Johnston's forces came on it.
Question. Then you were not a witness to that attack ?
Answer. No, sir ; I was not a witness to the final rout of our army.
Question. When you Vere wounded and taken off the field was it your opin- ion that you had the advantage of the enemy ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you have not learned anything since to change your opinion of that?
Answer. No, sir. I supposed, when they took me to the hospital, that the day was ours. '
By Mr. Johnson:
Question. What did you understand to be the amount of that last re-enforce- ment of Johnston's ?
Answer. I have been informed that it was about 4,000 men.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Can you tell me how far Schenck's brigade was from your troops at that time ?
Answer. No, sir; I cannot tell where it was.
Question. All you know about was the action of Hunter's division?
Answer. Yes, sir.
ByMr.OdeU:
Question. Ton were in Hunter's division and rested at Centreville, did you not?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you remember why it was you rested there an hour, or an hour and a half, on Sunday morning ?
Answer. I never understood that. I understood that there was some confu- sion among the troops ahead of us. Somebody was in their way, I understood. It was a very unfortunate resting spell.
54 TESTIMONY. .
By Mr. Chandler r Question. But for that yon would have won the day ? Answer. Yes, sir; I think so.
ByMr.Odell:
Question. It changed the position of the enemy entirely, did it notf Answer. It gave them this time to hring up their re-enforcements and rout us. If we had been there an hour sooner we should have carried the day. I was wounded on their strongest position. The place where I was wounded was where they had their best batteries at the time we came on the field ; they had retired from that position, and left it entirely, and were probably a mile from us.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. At the time you were wounded t Answer. Yes, sir.
Question.* And were in rout — retreating? Answer. Yes, sir.
ByMr.Odell:
Question. Your regiment was camped in this city, in the open square back of Wifiard's Hotel, for some time, was it not!
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you started from there the morning of the advance ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You crossed the Long Bridge ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; and went down to join McDowell's column just below the Long Bridge, going out by Bailey's Cross Itaads. *
Question. You rested there once one night?
Answer. We rested the first night at Anandale.
Question. And proceeded the next morning ?
Answer. Yes, sir
Washington, December 31, 1861. General Charles W. Sanford sworn and examined.
ByMr.Odell:
Question. We want to know especially your relation to the Bull Run battle ; that was the object of the committee in sending for you ; you were here, were you not ?
Answer. I made a movement into Virginia on the 24th of May. I left, under the orders of General Scott, directed to me, at 2 o'clock in the morning, with about 11,000 men, and 'took possession of Arlington Heights and the whole of that region, down to Alexandria, inclusive. . Question. What position did you then hold?
Answer. I was called into Bervice as a major general of the State of New York immediately after the news of the attack on Fort Sumter, at the request of General Scott, and with the sanction of the governor of my own State. I sent off as rapidly as possible all the troops I could for the relief of Washing- ton. I sent off in the first week from the city of New York about 8,000 men, commencing on the 19th of April ; and I then continued engaged in the organi- zation of other troops there until General Scott sent for me, and I came from New York here on the 20th of May, having, in the meantime, sent off from my own division in the city of New York about 10,000 men. When I arrived here
TESTIMONY. 55
•
General Scott issued an order placing me in command of all the troops from the State of New York. My own division proper comprises only the troops in the city and county of New York and the county of Richmond, having command of about 10,000 uniformed troops, and enrolling about 90,000 ununiformed troops in the whole district. When I arrived here, there being no general officer from my State, and I being the senior major general in the State of New York, General Scott issued an order placing all the troops from the State of New York, as fast as they arrived, under my command ; and I continued in that com- mand until I was sent into Virginia. I crossed over the morning of the 24th of May, and took command of the troops ordered into Virginia, That morning I proceeded up to the railroad beyond Ball's Grossing, and cut the railroad in two places, capturing some persons who came down on the railroad, to prevent their carrying information ; and from there I examined the whole country all the way down to Alexandria. I remained there getting additional troops over, forming such plans as I thought necessary for the fortification and occupation of that region, and getting ready to move, as I proposed to do, further down into Virginia, until the morning of the 28th of May, when the cabinet appointed Gene- ral McDowell to take command of a new department, organized as the depart- ment of Virginia ; and General McDowell being a junior officer to me, being appointed to that department, of course superseded my command over there. I returned to Washington and resumed my command of the New York troops there; they continued to increase* so, that on the 4th of July, independent of all I had sent over to Virginia, I had still 23 regiments of New York troops in the city of Washington, which I forwarded that day.
On the 29th of June a council of war was held at the White House by the President and his cabinet, and all the senior officers on service here, to consider the propriety of an attack on the enemy's lines at Manassas. I made some ob- jections to the plan of that battle, and among other things — I only mention this because it comes in with what I did afterwards — I objected that no movement of that kind should be made until it was ascertained that General Patterson was in such a position as to prevent the junction between General Johnston's army and the troops at Manassas; that that ought to precede any advance against the enemy at Manassas, if it was made at all.
On the 6th of July 1 was sent for by Governor Seward, who informed me that, although a great deal of dissatisfaction had existed respecting the move- ments of General Patterson, the cabinet had decided not to remove him ; but General Scott suggested — to use Governor Seward's words — that although Gen- eral Patterson did not seem to be disposed to fight, he was satisfied that I was otherwise disposed ; and that he had recommended that if I would go up and waive rank to General Patterson, I being a seniormajor general to him, General Patterson would be glad to give me an opportunity to fight a battle and have the credit of a victory if I succeeded. Governor Seward said that General Scott was desirous I should waive rank to Patterson, and go there and take a com- mand under him for the purpose of pushing forward the army, and doing what I suggested was- a necessary step prior to the battle of Manassas. I told Gov- ernor Seward that I would do anything, if it was to serve as a volunteer in the ranks, to aid the cause. He wrote a letter to General Scott stating what was the result of the interview between us, and I delivered it to the general, and re- ceived his orders to go with such troops as I deemed necessary to aid General Patterson, and to assume a command under him.
I sent off that night the 19th and 28th New York regiments, and followed the next day with two more regiments, the two best I had here, the 5th and 12th New York city regiments. I went around by way of Harrisburg and Hagers- town, which was* the only way then open. I left Hagerstown a little before sun- down, marching all the night of the 9th of July with those two regiments from
56 TESTIMONY.
• Hagerstown to Wflliamsport, and was there bv daylight the next morning. The other two regiments arrived there the day before.
I reported to General Patterson, and arranged with him to take command of a division, consisting of about 8,000 men, the most of them New York troops. I delivered orders <rom General Scott to General Patterson, and urged a forward movement as rapidly as possible. With the troops that I took on were some others that I had detailed to General Stone, who arrived immediately after my arrival at Hagerstown. General Patterson's army was increased to 22,000 men, of which I had under my own command 8,000, with two batteries.
We had some delay at Martinsburg, notwithstanding the urgency of our matter; but we left there on the 15th of July, and went in the direction of Winchester. General Patterson, with two of his divisions, went down on the Winchester turnpike in a straight line from Martinsburg towards Winchester, while I took the side roads, more easterly, so as to get into a direction to enable me to flank Johnston, keeping constantly in communication with Patterson through the inter- vening country. I moved down, in fact, in advance of his force until I arrived a little to the eastward of Bunker Hill, General Patterson holding Bunker Hill, which was a little village in the lower part of Berkley county.
We halted there on the afternoon of the 15th of July. On that same after- noon General Patterson came around with his staff to where I was engaged in locating my camp, sending out pickets, &c. I had a conversation with him on the subject of our moving forward. I was* anxious, of course, to progress as rapidly as possible, for fear this movement of Johnston might take place before we arrived at his camp. I was then within about nine miles of Johnston's fortified camp at Winchester. Patterson was complimenting me upon the manner in which my regiments were located, and inquiring about my pickets, which I had informed him I had sent downjtbont three miles to a stream below. I had driven out the enemy's skirmishers ahead of us. They had some cavalry there. In answer to his compliments about the comfortable location I had made, I said, " Very comfortable, general, when shall we move on 1 " This was in presence of part of my staff; Colonel Morell, now General Morell, was one, and Patterson's own staff. They were mounted and we were on foot. He hesitated a moment or two, and then said : " I don't know yet when we shall move. And if I did I would not tell my own father." I thought that was rather a queer sort of speech to make to me under the circumstances. But I smiled and said, " General, I am only anxious that we shall get forward, that the enemy shall not escape us." He replied, " There is no danger of that. I will havt a reconnoissance to-morrow, and we will arrange about moving at a very early period." He then took his leave. The next day there was a reconnois- sance on the Winchester turripike, about four or five miles below the general's camp. He sent forward a section of artillery and some cavalry, and they found a post and leg fence across the Winchester turnpike, and some of the enemy's cavalry on the other side of it. They gave tnem a round of grape. The cavalry scattered off, and the reconnoissance returned. That was the only reconnoissance I heard of while we were there. My own pickets went further than that. But it was understood the next afternoon that we were to march forward at daylight. I sent down Colonel Morell with 40 men to open a road down to the Opequan creek, within five miles of the camp at Winchester, on the side roads I was upon, which would enable me in the course of three hours to get between Johnston and the Shenandoah river, and effectually bar his way to Manassas. I had my ammunition all distributed, and ordered my men to have 24 hours' rations in their haversacks, independent of their breakfast. We were to march at four o'clock the next morning. I had this road to the Opequan completed that night. I had then with me, in addition to my eight regiments, amounting to about 8,000 men and a few cavalry, Doubleday's heavy United States battery of 20 and 30 pounders, and a very good Rhode Island battery.
TESTIMONY. ^ '57
And I wa* willing to take the risk, whether General Patterson followed me up or not, of placing myself between Johnston and the Shenandoah river, rather than Johnston escape. And at four o'clock I should have moved over that road for that purpose, if I had had no further orders. But a little after 12 o'clock at night I received a long order of three pages from General Patterson, instructing me to move on to Gharlestown, which is nearly at right angle* to the road I was going to move on, and 22 miles from Winchester. This was after I had given my orders for the other movement.
By Mr. Chandler : 9
Question. What day was that?
Answer. It was at 12 o'clock on the night of the 16th of July. I received that order — which was the first intimation I had of any kind or sort that we were not going to move on to Winchester— with a peremptory order to move at three o'clock in the morning to Gharlestown, which was nearly at right angles to the position I was then occupying in my route towards Winchester, and twenty-two miles from Winchester.
By the chairman :
Question. And that left Johnston free 1
Answer. Yes, sir; left him free to make his escape, which he did. (Pointing to the map.) Here is Martinshurg. After crossing the Potomac we came down to Martinsburg and then moved from Martinshurg down to Bunker Hill. This Winchester turnpike, passing down here, brought General Patterson down in a straight line from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill. I pursued the side roads for the purpose of flanking Johnston, who was at Winchester, just below. This is the road (pointing to it on the map) leading down from Bunker Hill to Win- chester. It is nearly a straight line from Martinsburg right down to Winches- ter. I was there; my camp lay right in here, (pointing to the place;) and the general was with his two divisions at the little village of Bunker Hill. I pursued these cross roads and had sent down and opened this road, (pointing to it,) which was an old and almost discontinued road, to a bridge which was here on the Opequan creek. The distance from my position to the bridge was about three and one half miles. I advanced a strong picket of some two hundred or three hundred men to keep the enemy from burning the bridge, and made the road fit for the artillery to travel over. I was then directed, by this order I have referred to, instead of moving in this direction, which would have enabled me to get between Johnston and the Shenandoah river, to move on this road (pointing it out) until I got upon the road which leads from Winchester to Gharlestown. The distance between Gharlestown and Winchester was twenty- two miles, while the distance from Bunker Hill was only nine miles.
Question. In what direction would Johnston have had to move to get by you?
Answer. Bight out to the Shenandoah river, which he forded. He found out from his cavalry, who were watching us, that we were actually leaving, and he started at one o'clock that same day with eight thousand men, forded the Shenandoah where it was so deep that he ordered his men to put their car- tridge boxes on their bayonets, got out on the Leesburg road, and went down to Manassas.
ByMr.Odell:
Question. Now, about your orders 1
Answer. I was here, (referring to the map,) a little southeast of Bunker Hill, and General Patterson was at Bunker Hill. Originally my arrangement was to go down this way, (pointing.) That was my own arrangement with Patter- Bon's consent. That was part of the understanding with which we started from Martinsburg. And I still supposed, up to 12 o'clock on the night of the 16th
58 TESTIMONY.
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of July, that I was to go down this way or continue where I was, and he was to sustain me if I got into a fight. I had not the slightest idea that we were going to retrograde.
Question. Had you given out your orders 1 . '
Answer. My orders were out for the men to have all the ammunition dis- tricted, and to have one day's provisions, exclusive of breakfast, in their haver- sacks, and to march at 4 o'clock in the morning. And Patterson knew that I had 400 men out at this bridge, on the road I had opened, yet I was ordered to move at 3 o'clock in another direction, which operated to let Johnston escape. I have never made tlfese facts public at all. I have spoken among my very per- sonal friends about it ; and I reported immediately, as soon as I got back here, to General Scott, who was extremely indignant about the whole matter. I did not speak of it as freely as I have done, until this very strange publication of General Patterson the other day, which appeared to put the burden of the whole matter upon General Scott, when, in feet, it was all his own act.
By the chairman :
Question. Did he assign any reason for that movement ?
Answer. I was, of course, very indignant about it, and so were all my officers and men, so much so that when subsequently, at Harper's Feny, Patterson came by my camp there was a universal groan — against all discipline, of course, and we suppressed it as soon as possible. The excuse given by General Pat- terson was this : that he had received intelligence that he could rely upon, that General Johnston had been re-enforced by 20,000 men from Manassas, and was going to make an attack upon him ; and in the order which I received that night — a long order of three pages — I was ordered to occupy all the communi- cating roads, turning off a regiment here, and two or three regiments there, and a battery at another place, to occupy all the roads from Winchester to the neighborhood of Charlestown, and all the cross-roads, and hold them all that day, until General Patterson's whole army went by me to Charlestown ; and I sat seven hours in the saddle near a place called Smithfield, while Patterson, with his whole army, went by me on their way to Charlestown, he being appre- hensive, as he said, of an attack from Johnston's forces.
ByMr.Odell:
Question. You covered his movement?'
Answer. Yes, sir. Now the statement that he made, which came to me through Colonel Abercrombie, who was Patterson's brother-in-law, and com- manded one division in that army was, that Johnston had been re-enforced, and General Fitz-John Porter reported the same thing to my officers. General Porter was then the chief of Patterson's staff, and was a very excellent officer, and an accomplished soldier. They all had got this story, which was without the slightest snadow of foundation; for there nad not a single man arrived at the camp since we had got fall information that their whole force consisted of 20,000 men, of whom 1,800 were sick with the measles. The story was, how- ever, that they had ascertained by reliable information of this re-enforcement. Where they got their information I do not know. None such reached me, and I picked up deserters and other persons to get all the information I could ; and we since have learned, as a matter of certainty, that Johnston's force never did exceed 20,000 men there. But the excuse Patterson gave was that Johnston had been re-enforced with 20,000 men from Manassas, and was going to attack him. That was the reason he gave then for this movement. But in this paper he has lately published he hints at another reason — another excuse, which was that it was by order of General Scott. Now, I know that the peremptory order of General Scott to General Patterson, repeated over and over again, was this — I was present on several occasions when telegraphic despatches went from Gen-
TESTIMONY. * 59
eral Scott to General Patterson : General Scott's orders to General Patterson •were that, if he were strong enough he was to attack and beat Johnston. But if not, then he was to place himself in such a position as to keep Johnston em- ployed and prevent him from making a junction with Beauregard at Manassas. That was the repeated direction of General Scott to General Patterson ; an/1 it was because of Patterson's hesitancy, and his hanging back, and keeping so far beyond the reach of Johnston's camp, that I was ordered to go up there and re- enforce him, and assist him in any operations necessary to effect that object. The excuse of General Patterson now is that he had orders fjom General Scott to move to Gharlestown. Now, that is not so. But this state of things existed : Before the movement was made from Martinsburg, General Patterson suggested to General Scott that Charlestown would be a better base of operations than Martinsburg, and suggested that he had better move on Charlestown, and from thence make his approaches to Winchester; that it would be better to do that than to move directly to Winchester from Martinsburg; and General Scott wrote back to say that if he found that movement a better one, he was at liberty to make it. But General Patterson had already commenced his movement on Winchester direct from Martinsburg;, and had got as far as Bunker Hill; so that the movement, which he had formerly suggested, to Charlestown, was suppressed by his own act. But that is the pretence now given in his published speech for making the movement from Bunker Hill to Charlestown, which was a retreat, instead of the advance which the movement to Charlestown, he first proposed to General Scott